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NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
v. J. WEINGARTEN, INC.
AN OVERVIEW OF THE
DEVELOPMENT AND
APPLICATION OF THE NLRA SECTION 7
RIGHT TO REPRESENTATION
JOHN

I.

H. F ANNING*

INTRODUCTION

InNLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc.,' the Supreme Court affirmed a

holding of the National Labor Relations Board (the Board) that an
employer commits an unfair labor practice under section 8(a)(1) of
the National Labor Relations Act (the Act)2 by denying an em
ployee's request for union representation at an investigatory inter
view which the employee reasonably believes might result in
disciplinary action. 3 In reversing a decision of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which had denied enforce
• Member of the Rhode Island and United States Supreme Court Bars; A.B.,
Providence College; LL.B., Catholic University School of Law. Member of the National
Labor Relations Board from 1957 to 1982, and Chairman of the Board from April 14,
1977 to August 14, 1981. Member Fanning retired from the Board on December 16,1982
after completing his fifth five-year term. He is happy to acknowledge the assistance of
Edward Noonan in the preparation of this article. Mr. Noonan, a graduate of Brown
University and the National Law Center, George Washington University, is a member of
the Rhode Island and District of Columbia bars.
I. 420 U.S. 251 (1975).
2. 29 u.s.c. § 158(a)(I) (1976). Section 8(a)(I) states that it is an unfair labor
practice for an employer "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed in section [7] . . . ."
3. 420 U.S. at 466-68.
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ment of the Board's order in Weingarten ,4 the Supreme Court upheld
the Board's construction of section 7 of the Act. S This construction
acknowledges that the right of employees to engage in concerted ac
tivity for mutual aid or protection encompasses the right of an em
ployee not only to insist upon, 6 but to have, 7 the assistance of his
union representative at such an interview. Specifically, the Court
agreed with the Board's holding that an employer's denial of such a
request interferes with, restrains, and coerces the employee in the
exercise of his rights guaranteed by section 7 of the Act.
From the standpoint of a decisionmaker, Weingarten is signifi
cant for its recognition of the Board's "responsibility to adapt the
Act to changing patterns of industrial life. "8 While the Court noted
that the Board's construction of section 7 was "newly arrived at"9
and contrary to earlier Board precedent holding that section 7 pro
vided employees no right to representation at investigatory inter
views,1O the Court held, nevertheless, that such contrary precedent
did not impair the validity of the Board's Weingarten holding. I I
Noting that the Board has the "special function of applying the gen
eral provisions of the Act to the complexities of industrial life," 12 the
Court stated:
The use by an administrative agency of the evolutional approach
4. J. Weingarten, Inc., 202 N.L.R.B. 446 (1973), enforcement denied, 485 F.2d 1135
(5th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 420 U.S. 251 (1975).
5. 420 U.S. at 266-68. Section 7 provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collec
tive bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right
to refrain from any or an such activities except to the extent that such right may
be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a
condition of employment as authorized in Section [8](a)(3) . . ..
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
6. ILGWU v. Quality Mfg. Co., 420 U.S. 276 (1975). In Quality Mfg., the Court,
for the reasons stated in its Weingarten opinion, affirmed a finding by the Board that an
employer violated section 8(a)(I) by disciplining an employee for refusing to attend an
investigatory interview absent the requested union representative when the employee
reasonably feared that the interview might result in discipline. Iff. at 280-81. For the
NLRB's decision, see Quality Mfg. Co., 195 N.L.R.B. 197 (1972), enforcement denied in
part, 481 F.2d 1018 (4th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 420 U.S. 276 (1975).
7. See Mobil Oil Corp., 196 N.L.R.B. 1052 (1972), enforcement denied, 482 F.2d
842 (7th Cir. 1973) (court found no concerted activity within meaning of the Act).
8. 420 U.S. at 266.
.
9. Iff. at 267.
10. Iff. at 264-65.
II. Iff. at 265.
12. Iff. at 266 (quoting NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 236 (1963».
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is particularly fitting. To hold that the Board's earlier decisions
froze the development of this important aspect of the national la
bor law would misconceive the nature of administrative decision
making. "'Cumulative experience' begets understanding and in
sight by which judgments ... are validated or qualified or invali
dated. The constant process of trial and error, on a wider and
fuller scale than a single adversary litigation permits, differentiates
perhaps more than anything else the administrative from the judi
cial process."13
The Court thus recognized the Board's duty to balance the com
peting interests of employees and their employer when the Board is
faced with a claim that a particular employer action restrained, co
erced, or interfered with section 7 rights. In doing so, the Court also
recognized the Board's authority to alter the balance of the compet
ing interests in light of industrial developments.
In the seven years since the Supreme Court's Weingarten deci
sion, the Board has continued to interpret section 7 of the Act in the
context of employee requests for representation at meetings in which
the reasonable fear of disciplinary action obtains. In this article I
shall present an overview of the Board's efforts in this area of the
law. I shall discuss the origins and the evolution of the right to rep
resentation, as well as the Board's post-Weingarten application of the
right. In doing so, I hope to provide a view of the current status of
the law and an awareness of the statutory policies which gave rise to
the right.
II.

ORIGINS OF THE RIGHT

The Board first faced the question of whether section 7 encom
passed the right of an employee to refuse to deal with his employer
without representation in Ross Gear and Tool Co. 14 In Ross Gear,
the employer discharged a member of the bargaining committee for
refusing to attend a meeting with management unaccompanied by
her fellow committee members. The Board found that the purpose
of the meeting was to discuss a matter that had been raised during
collective bargaining negotiations and that the employee had been
summoned, in part, because of her membership on the bargaining
committee. IS Under such circumstances, the Board concluded that
the employee was within her statutory rights to insist that the em
13. 420 U.S. at 265-66 (quoting NLRB v. Seven-Up Co., 344 U.S. 344, 349 (1953».
14. 63 N.L.R.B. 1012 (1945), enforcement denied, 158 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1947).
15. Id. at 1034.
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ployer deal with the whole committee, rather than her alone, and
that the discharge therefore violated section 8(a)(l).I6 The Board's
holding in Ross Gear clearly effectuated a statutory policy underly
ing section 7 of the Act: In order to redress the imbalance of power
between employers and employees, employees have the right to be
represented by their collective bargaining agent in matters affecting
terms and conditions of employment. However, the Board specifi
cally distinguished the facts of the instant case, where the meeting
had been called to discuss matters appropriate for the bargaining ta
ble, from the case where an employee is summoned to a meeting
held to admonish the employee for misconduct,l7 In the latter in
stance, the employer's legitimate right to manage its business and
impose discipline is an added weight to be balanced against the con
commitant right of employees to act in concert to protect themselves
against adverse employer action.
In Dobbs House, Inc. 18 the Board addressed the issue of whether
section 7 encompassed a right to representation during an interview
from which disciplinary actions might result. There, the Board
adopted a trial examiner's finding that the employer did not violate
section 8(a)(I) by denying an employee's request that a union repre
sentative be allowed to attend a meeting called for the purpose of
discharging the employee for misconduct. 19 The trial examiner had
stated:
I fail to perceive anything in the Act which obliges an employer to
permit the presence of a representative of the bargaining agent in
every situation where an employer is compelled to admonish or to
otherwise take disciplinary action against an employee, particu
larly in those situations where the employee's conduct is unrelated
to any legitimate union or concerted activity. An employer un
doubtedly has the right to maintain day-to-day discipline in the
plant or on the working premises and it seems to me that only
exceptional circumstances should warrant any interference with
this right.2o

The trial examiner distinguished Ross Gear, noting that under the
instant facts the employee "was discharged for cause and the dis
charge conference was not predicated upon her involvement in any
16. Id. The Board also found that discharge necessarily constituted discrimination
which discouraged union membership in violation of section 8(a)(3). Id.
17. Id. at \033-34.
18. 145 N.L.R.B. 1565 (1964).
19. Id. at 157\.
20. Id.

1982]

RIGHT TO REPRESENTATION

5

protected union activity."21 The decision in Dobbs House recog
nized the legitimate right of an employer to impose discipline for
misconduct. The decision, however, also limited the right to repre
sentation to meetings where an employee was to be disciplined for
concerted or union activities but did not address the full scope of
activity adversely affected by the employer's denial of the represen
tation request. For, it was by requesting or insisting upon union rep
resentation that the employee exercised his section 7 rights.
This fact was recognized in Texaco, Inc., Houston Producing Di
vision .22 There, the employee had been suspended for an alleged
theft and was thereafter given the opportunity to meet with manage
ment to defend himself. Before the meeting, the employee requested
union representation and the union requested the right to be present.
The Board found that the employer's denial of the employee's re
quest violated section 7. 23 The Board noted that the meeting was
"not simply part of an investigation"24 and that the employee's at
tendance was not solely to provide the company with information. 25
Rather, the Board viewed the meeting as one held in order for the
company to conclude its case against the employee and provide a
record to support disciplinary action. 26 Given the nature of the
meeting, the Board stated:
Thus it is clear that on November 17 the Company sought to deal
directly with [the employee] concerning matters affecting his terms
and conditions of employment. Yet, as noted, the employees in
the unit had selected the Union to deal with the [company] on
such matters and there is no evidence that either [the employee]
assuming he could have done so--<>r the Union had waived to any
extent the right of representation or had agreed to channelize dis
putes concerning such right into the procedures of the contract
grievance provisions. Consequently, . . . the [company's] refusal
to respect [the employee's] request that the bargaining representa
tive be permitted to represent him at the meeting interfered with
and restrained him in the exercise of his rights guaranteed by Sec
tion 7 of the Act,21

The Board's reasoning was similar to that utilized in Ross Gear.
21. Id
22. 168 N.L.R.B. 361 (1967), enforcement denied, 408 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1969).
23. Id at 362-63.
24. Id at 362.
25. Id
26. Id
27. Id
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Once the Board had determined that discipline was a matter affect
ing an employee's terms and conditions of employment, it followed
that a represented employee had a right not to be compelled to deal
with his employer alone, meaning that the employee had a right to
be represented by the exclusive bargaining agent. 28 This reasoning
affected the development of the law in two significant ways. First,
given that discipline was a term and condition of employment, it
followed that not only did the employee have a right to be repre
sented by the union, but that the employer had an affirmative obliga
tion under section 8(a)(5)29 to meet with the union. In Texaco, the
Board found that, in light of the employee's request for representa
tion and the union's willingness to represent him, the employer's re
fusal to deal with the union violated section 8(a)(5).30 Second, the
Board was compelled to restrict the employee's right to representa
tion and the union's right to represent the employee to interviews
involving terms or conditions of employment. The Board, therefore,
distinguished between interviews conducted solely for the purpose of
gathering information and those which did not yet involve discipline
from interviews in which a decision to discipline the employee had
already been made. 31
In a number of post-Texaco cases, the Board adhered to the
view that the right to representation attached only to disciplinary
interviews and stemmed both from the employee's rights under sec
tion 7 and the union's rights under section 8(a)(5).32 For example, in
28. Id The reasoning employed by the Board should not be read as differentiating
the section 7 rights of represented employees from those granted unrepresented employ
ees. The Board in Texaco was faced with having to apply section 7 to a request for union
representation. The Board found that the refusal to respect the request for representation
was a restraint on rights guaranteed by section 7. Id The Board was not faced with, nor
did it decide, whether a request for representation by an unrepresented employee like
wise fell within the protective ambit of section 7.
29. 29 U.S.C. § IS8(a)(S) (1976). Section 8(a)(S) provides that it is an unfair labor
practice for an employer "to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his
employees . . . ." Id
30. 168 N.L.R.B. at 362.
31. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied enforcement of the Board's
order in Texaco. Texaco Inc., Houston Producing Div. v. NLRB, 408 F.2d 142 (Sth Cir.
1969). However, it did so solely because it viewed the interview as investigatory rather
than disciplinary. Id at 14S. Further, the Court characterized the section 7 right in
volved as the right of employees "to bargain collectively through their chosen representa
tives." Id at 144. Thus, the Fifth Circuit adopted the Board's investigatory/disciplinary
distinction as well as its view that section 7 provides an employee a right to representa
tion by his union in matters regarding terms and condition of his employment.
32. See, e.g., Lafayette Radio Elecs. Corp., 194 N.L.R.B. 491 (1971); Illinois Bell
Tel. Co., 192 N.L.R.B. 834 (1971); United Aircraft Corp., 179 N.L.R.B. 93S (1969), en
forced, 440 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1971); Texaco Inc., Los Angeles Sales Terminal, 179
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Chevron Oil CO.,33 the Board adopted a trial examiner's decision
finding that an employer violated neither section 8(a)(l) nor section
8(a)(5) by denying an employee's request for representation at a
mere factfinding interview. 34 Similarly, in Dayton TYpographical
Service, Inc. ,35 the Board adopted a trial examiner's dismissal of an
alleged section 8(a)(I) violation that was based on the denial of a
request for union representation at a purely investigatory interview.
Relying on both Texaco and Chevron Oil, the trial examiner con
cluded that
only where an employee as is called in discussion with manage
ment on a problem involving his performance, which has gone
beyond the fact finding or investigatory state to a point where
management has decided that discipline of that specific employee
is appropriate, that the Employer is required on demand of either
the employee or his bargaining agent to permit that agent to be
present. 36

The next significant development in the evolution of the right to
representation occured in Quality Manufacturing CO.37 There a ma
jority38 of the Board found that section 7 guaranteed a right to repre
sentation on a basis distinct from that found to exist in Texaco, one
which rendered irrelevant any distinction between investigatory and
disciplinary interviews. 39 The employee in. Quality ManufactUring
N.L.R.B. 976 (1969); Wald Mfg. Co., 176 N.L.R.B. 839 (1969), enforced, 426 F.2d 1328
(6th Cir. 1970); Dayton Typographic Serv., 176 N.L.R.B. 357 (1969); Jacobe-Pearson
Ford Inc., 172 N.L.R.B. 594 (1968); Chevron Oil Co., 168 N.L.R.B. 574 (1967).
33. 168 N.L.R.B. 574 (1967).
34. The trial examiner stated:
To be sure, [s]ection 7 of the Act guarantees to employees the right to be
represented by their collective-bargaining representative in all areas pertaining
to their terms and conditions of employment, and the penalty of suspension
from work for alleged insubordination most assuredly is encompassed within
those terms and conditions. Moreover, [s]ections 9(a) and 8(a)(5) obligate an
employer to deal with a duly designated labor organiZation concerning all mat
ters which affect the employment tenure of the represented employees. But this
is not to say that a bargaining agent must be privy to management councils, or
that represented employees must be shielded by that agent from company in
quiries, on each and every occasion when management embarks upon an inves
tigation to ascertain whether plant discipline has been breached.
Id at 578.
35. 176 N.L.R.B. 357 (1969).
36. Id at 361.
37. 195 N.L.R.B. 197 (1972), enforcement denied in part, 481 F.2d 1018 (4th Cir.
1973), rev'd, 420 U.S. 276 (1975).
38. Former Chairman Miller, Member Fanning, and Member Jenkins composed
the majority. Former Member Kennedy dissented in part.
39. Id at 198.
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was suspended and then discharged for refusing to attend an investi
gatory interview without union representation. 40 Further, one union
steward was suspended and another was suspended and discharged
for insisting upon representing the employee. 41 Despite the fact that
the interview was investigatory in nature, the Board found that the
employee's discharge violated section 8(a)(l).42 In doing so, the
Board first distinguished Texaco and the cases based thereon as in
volving only the issue of whether an employer's denial of a request
for representation violated its duty to bargain with the union under
section 8(a)(5).43 The Board noted that none of those cases involved
a "situation where an employee or his representative had been disci
plined or discharged for requesting, or insisting on, union represen
tation in the course of an interview."44 Further, according to the
majority, those cases had not directly considered the section 7 right
of individual employees to act in concert "for mutual aid or
protection."45
What led the Board to characterize Texaco and its progeny as
limited solely to the union's right to represent the employee under
section 8(a)(5) was the Board's adoption of a new view of the em
ployee's request in terms of the guarantees of section 7. In Texaco,
the employee's request was seen as the exercise of the right to be
represented by one's union in matters affecting terms and conditions
of employment. 46 Such right stemmed from the section 7 guarantee
that employees had the right to bargain with their employer through
representatives of their own choosing.47 In Quality Manufacturing,
however, the Board viewed the employee's insistence upon represen
tation not as a refusal to deal individually with the employer over a
bargainable matter but rather as concerted activity for mutual aid or
protection. 48 This new view rendered meaningless any distinction
between investigatory and disciplinary interviews insofar as the em
ployee's section 7 rights were concerned. Since through the request
the employee sought protection or aid against employer action, it
was no longer necessary that the interview involve an actual term or
condition of employment; a potential that the employee's continued
40.

195 N.L.R.B. at 197-98.

41.
42.

fd.
fd. at 199.
fd. at 198.
fd.
fd.

43.
44.

45.
46. 168 N.L.R.B. at 362.
47. fd.
48. 195 N.L.R.B. at 198-99.
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employment or working condition would be adversely affected as a
result of the interview was sufficient. 49 The Board thus stated:
After reflection, we have concluded that it is a serious violation of
an employee's individual right to be represented by his union if he
can only request or insist on such representation under penalty of
disciplinary action. And while the employer's denial of such re
quest may not derogate the bargaining rights of the union, in vio
lation of Section 8(a)(5), in the case of a purely investigatory
interview, this is not to say either: (a) that the employer may dis
cipline the employee for demanding representation; or (b) that
the employer may insist, by threatening to discipline the em
ployee's representative, that the interview be held without his
presence. 50

Having found that an employee engages in concerted activity
for mutual aid or protection by requesting or insisting upon union
representation at an investigatory interview,51 the Board, in Quality
Manufacturing, proceeded to balance this right against the em
ployer's legitimate interests and prerogatives in investigating miscon
duct. The Board held that the right applied only to interviews in
which the employee had a reasonable ground to believe that the in
terview would adversely affect his working conditions. 52 In further
recognition of the employer's interest, the Board noted that the em
ployer, when faced with a request for representation, was under no
obligation to conduct the interview. 53 Rather, the employer could in
form the employee that no interview would be conducted unless the
employee was willing to attend unrepresented.54 The employer
could thus "reject a collective course in situations such as investiga
49. Later, the Board applied the "mutual aid or protection" analysis to requests for
representation at disciplinary interviews. Certified Grocers, 227 N.L.R.B. 1211 (1977),
enforcement denied, 587 F.2d 449 (9th Cir. 1978); see infra text accompanying notes 117
34.
50. 195 N.L.R.B. at 198. The Board in Quality Mj'g. also found that the discipline
of the union stewards violated section 8(a)(I) as the discipline stemmed from the stew
ards' attempts to perform their duties as union officials by representing the employee. Id
at 199.
51. Compare Emerson Elec. Co., 185 N.L.R.B. 346 (1970) with Quality Mfg. Co.,
195 N.L.R.B. at 199 n.7 (distinguishing Emerson Elec. on its facts).
52. 195 N.L.R.B. at 198-99. The Board stated that "reasonable ground" would be
determined by objective standards under all the circumstances in the case. Id at 198 n.3.
It also stated that the right would not apply to run-of-the-mill shop floor conversations
such as the giving of instructions, counselling, or correction of work technique, where no
reasonable ground existed for the employee to believe that discipline would result. Id at
19~
..
53. Id
54. See id
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tory interviews where a collective course is not required"55 while the
employee was still guaranteed his right to protection by his chosen
representatives. The Board noted that, with participation in the in
terview being voluntary, the employee risked losing whatever benefit
might result from the interview and that the employer was free to act
upon whatever information it had absent the interview. 56
In Quality Manufacturing, the employee had been disciplined
because she exercised a section 7 right-the insistence upon repre
sentation by her union. In Mobil Oil Corp. ,57 the Board extended its
holding in Quality Manufacturing, finding that the section 7 right to
engage in concerted activity for mutual aid or protection also barred
an employer from conducting an investigatory interview after deny
ing the employee's request. 58 In Mobil Oil, the employees involved
had a reasonable fear of discipline but did not refuse to attend the
investigatory interviews. Rather, at the employer's insistence, each
employee attended the interview after his individual request for rep
resentation was denied. The Board noted, as it had in Quality Manu
facturing, that the employer had the right to offer each employee the
option of attending the interview without representation or foregoing
the benefit of any interview. But to compel the employee to attend
the interview unassisted constituted, according to the Board, "un
warranted interference" with the employee's section 7 right to "insist
on concerted protection, rather than individual self-protection,
against possible adverse employer action."59
The Board's view that section 7 provided a right to union repre
sentation at investigatory interviews which an employee reasonably
feared would result in discipline was met with disagreement when
the Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Seventh Circuits denied
enforcement inNLRB v. Quality Manufacturing Co. ,60 and Mobil Oil
55. Id at 198.
56. Id at 199.
57. 196 N.L.R.B. 1052 (1972), enforcement denied, 482 F.2d 842 (7th Cir. 1973).
The same panel that constituted the majority on Quality Mfg. , Former Chairman Miller,
Member Fanning and Member Jenkins, decided the Mobil Oil case. Former Member
Kennedy, as he had in Quality Mfg. , dissented.
58. Id
59. Id The Board took the opportunity to emphasize that, while the employee had
an individual right under section 7 to union representation at an investigatory interview,
the union had no particular right to represent the employee other than that which it
could obtain through collective bargaining. Id The Board thus continued to distinguish
between investigatory and disciplinary interviews insofar as the union's rights under sec
tion 8(a)(5) were concerned.
60. 481 F.2d 1018 (4th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 420 U.S. 276 (1975).
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Corp. v. NLRB ,61 respectively, on this issue. In Quality Manufactur
ing, the Fourth Circuit found that the Board's construction of sec
tion 7 was contrary to the Texaco line of cases, holding that no right
to representation existed at investigatory interviews. 62
The Seventh Circuit, in Mobil 011, correctly noted that the
Board's decision had not been based on the section 7 right of em
ployees to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, as had been the case in Texaco. Nevertheless, it found
that the section 7 right to act in concert for mutual aid or protection
was not so broad as to encompass a right to union representation at
investigatory interviews where the employee reasonably feared
discipline. 63
In Weingarten, the Supreme Court resolved the issue, holding
that the Board's construction of section 7, though not required was at
least, permissible under the Act. 64 In its decision, the Court first set
out the section 7 right to representation as it had been developed by
the Board in Quality Manufacturing and Mobil Oil. First, the right
only arises in situations where the employee requests representation
and has a reasonable belief that the investigation will result in disci
61. 482 F.2d 842 (7th Cir. 1973).
62. 481 F.2d at 1024-25. The court criticized the Board for failing to cite any legis
lative history or present "persuasive analysis of the statutory provisions" in support of its
holding. Id at 1025. In regard to the Board's previous decisions, the court stated:
[T]he Board has no power to alter or rearrange employer-employee relations to
suit its every whim. Rather, the Board can only determine whether the Act has
been violated. And it would appear that in the entire history of the law. . . the
management prerogative of conducting an investigatory interview such as
Quality attempted here has not been considered a violation of the Act.
Id
63. 482 F.2d at 847-48. The court found that the Board's construction of section 7
was based solely on the literal wording thereof rather than on underlying statutory pol
icy. Finding that the basic thrust of section 7 is to enable employees to organize and
apply economic pressure against their employers, the court stated:
In our opinion, economic pressure may properly be applied to compel employ
ers to follow acceptable investigatory procedures, or to determine the conse
quences of various kinds of misconduct, but economic pressure should not be a
component of the fact-finding process itself. The requested Union representa
tion at an investigatory interview is clearly not the kind of "concerted activity"
with which § 7 is primarily concerned.
Id at 847.
64. 420 U.S. at 266-67. The Board had found, relying on Mobil Oil, that the em
ployer violated section 8(a)(I) by conducting an investigatory interview after denying the
employee's request for union representation. J. Weingarten, Inc., 202 N.L.R.B. 446, 449,
enforcement denied, 485 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1973) (holding that the interview was a pre
mature stage at which to invoke a requirement of union representation where the pur
pose of the interview did not involve the imposition of disciplinary proceedings), rev'd,
420 U.S. 251 (1975).
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pline. 65 Second, the exercise of the employee's right may not inter
fere with -legitimate employer prerogatives, meaning that the
employer was under no obligation to conduct the interview. Since
the union derived no rights from the employee's exercise of his indi
vidual section 7 right, the employer did not have to bargain with the
union representative during any interview. 66
Having set forth the contours and limits67 of the right, the Court
proceeded to explicate its basis. It found that an employee's request
for union representation during an investigatory interview fell within
the literal wording of the section 7 phrase "concerted activities . . .
for mutual aid or protection," despite the fact that only the individ
ual employee had an immediate stake in the outcome of the investi
gation. The Court, instead, viewed the request as concerted activity
because the union representative would safeguard the interests of all
unit employees against unjust disciplinary procedures and his pres
ence would assure all employees that they could also have his assist
ance if called to an investigatory interview. 68 The Court also noted
that the Board's construction of section 7 effectuated the most funda
mental policy of the Act: the elimination of the imbalance of power
between employers and employees. 69 By requesting union repre
sentation, the employee was in effect seeking the aid and protection
of his fellow employees against adverse employer action. The
Board's holding that section 7 accorded employees the right to such
representation was, according to the Court, "within the protective
ambit of that section 'read in light of the mischief to be corrected and
the end to be attained.' "70
III.

POST WEINGARTEN DEVELOPMENTS

The Supreme Court's decision in Weingarten left open a
number of important subsidiary questions regarding the section 7
right to representation: While the right attaches to interviews in
which the reasonable fear of discipline obtains, what sort of ex
change or confrontation between an employer and an employee, in
terms of both extent and purpose, constitutes such an interview?
Since an employee must request representation, what constitutes a
sufficient request? Given that exercise of the Weingarten right need
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

420 U.S. at 257.
Id. at 258-59.
Id. at 260.
Id. at 260-61.
Id. at 262.
Id. at 262 (quoting NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. Ill, 124 (1944».
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not transform the interview into an adversary contest, what is the
proper role of the representative and to what extent can the em
ployer place limitations on that role? What is the proper remedy for
a violation of the Weingarten right?
In a number of post-Weingarten decisions, the Board has ad
dressed these and other questions, continually defining the "contours
and limits" of the section 7 right to engage in concerted activity for
mutual aid or protection as it relates to employer-employee ex
changes which present the potential for discipline.
A.

The «Interview"
1.

The Requirement of an "Exchange"

The section 7 right affirmed in Weingarten requires some sort of
exchange between employer and employee that may affect the em
ployee's terms and conditions of employment. Thus, the Board has
recognized the fact that not all meetings between an employer and
employees involving discipline or the potential thereof rise to the
level of an "interview" for purposes of the Weingarten right. For
example, the Board has held that an employer can summarily warn,
discipline, or pink slip an employee without having to provide a rep
resentative. 71 Such action merely represents the ministerial act of
imposing discipline without any exchange or discussion during
which the assistance of a representative could be sought or rendered.
Further, the Weingarten right as affirmed by the Supreme Court is
expressly limited by the employer's prerogative to forego the inter
view and impose discipline on the basis of whatever information it
has before it, rather than comply with a request for representation.
This limitation had been imposed in United States Gypsum,72 a pre
Weingarten decision. There, the Board adopted a trial examiner's
decision finding that an employer had lawfully denied an employee's
request for a union representative when the employee was admon
ished in a supervisor's office regarding an exchange with his fore
man. The trial examiner noted that the employee was asked no
questions, that no suggestion was made, "either expressly or by im
plication," that he admit or deny any accusation, or give assurance
that the alleged offense would not be repeated. 73 The limitation has
also been followed in post-Weingarten decisions. Thus, inAmoco Oil
71. Amoco Oil Co., 238 N.L.R.B. 551, 552 (1978).
72. 200 N.L.R.B. 305 (1972).
73. Id. at 308.
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Co. ,74 the Board held that an employer did not unlawfully deny an
employee's request where the employer "confined himself to a single
sentence informing [the employee] of his suspension" and made "no
attempt to question him, engage in any manner of dialogue, or par
ticipate in any other interchange which could be characterized as an
interview."75 These decisions merely represent the fact that a pre
requisite to the attachment of any right is the opportunity for its
exercise.
The Board has also limited the application of the Weingarten
right to meetings between an employer and employee which, by their
nature, allow for an "exchange." In United States Postal Service,76
the Board found that the right to representation did not attach to a
"fitness for duty" medical examination. 77 The Board found that the
"hands on" examination involved therein did not "meet with . . .
the tests set forth in the Weingarten line of cases, or the rationale
underlying these tests which envision a confrontation between the
employer and employee."78 The Board also noted that, given the
nature of a physical examination, the employer did not have the op
tion of proceeding on its own and independently acquiring the infor
mation it needed. 79 Significantly, however, the Board refused to pass
on whether the Weingarten right attached to any "interview" portion
of a medical examination which could result in action adverse to an
employee's interests or affect his terms and conditions of
employment. 80
The requirement that the confrontation between the employer
and employee include an exchange, as opposed to the physical exam
ination of a person or documents without any attendant questioning
or discussion, is consistent with the statutory policies underlying the
Weingarten right. For unlike a questioning or other exchange,
where explanations and mitigating factors can be proffered, where
arguments can be made and minds changed, and where an em
ployee's position can be defended, a physical examination does not
74. 238 N.L.R.B. 551 (1978). See also K-Mart Corp., 242 N.L.R.B. 855 (1979).
75. 238 N.L.R.B. at 552. But if. Alfred M. Lewis, Inc., 229 N.L.R.B. 757 (1977)
(employee has right to union representation at counseling sessions with employer in
which employee's work performance is discussed), enforcement denied in part, 587 F.2d
403 (9th Cir. 1978).
76. 252 N.L.R.B. 61 (1980).
77. Id. at 64-65.
78. Id. at 61.
79. Id. In this regard, however, see Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 251 N.L.R.B.
1591 (1980), enforcement denied, 661 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1981).
80. 252 N.L.R.B. at 61.
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present a perceived threat which is capable of being countered by
concerted action.
2.

The Nature and Purpose of the "Interview"

Determination of the type of discussion or interchange that
should give rise to the section 7 right to representation is more com
plex than determination of whether an interview has taken place at
all. Clearly, the interview must present some potential for action ad
verse to the employee's job interests. It can be argued, however, that
every time a supervisor talks with an employee there exists a poten
tial for discipline, whether as a function of the subject matter of the
discussion, meaning past or present misconduct or performance, or
merely as a result of what transpires during the discussion. There
fore, a distinction must be made between those employer-employee
meetings which present a real, discernible potential for disciplinary
action and those in which the potential is, at best, remote. The exer
cise of the Weingarten right has thus been limited to those employer
employee meetings in which the employee has a reasonable fear of
discipline. Generally, whether a reasonable fear of discipline at
taches to any interview or discussion is determined by the circum
stances of each case,8l however, certain types of discussions, by their
very nature, have been found not to give rise to a reasonable fear.
In Quality Manufacturing, the Board excepted from the section 7
right to representation the "run-of-the-mill shop floor conversations
as, for example, the giving of instruction or training or needed cor
rections of work techniques."82 While such conversations could con
ceivably result in discipline sometime in the future, they are more a
part of the act of supervision than something that could reasonably
be perceived as the employer's investigatory or disciplinary process.
As such, the need of an employer to engage in day-to-day supervi
sion of employees clearly outweighs the employee's need for assist
ance with regard to such conversations. One can only imagine the
havoc that would occur in the workplace if an employer were re
quired to accede to a request for representation each time a supervi
sor attempted to instruct or criticize an employee in the normal
course of his duties.
The Board has also excepted from the application of the Wein
garten right other types of employer-employee meetings or ex
changes which, like the "run-of-the-mill shop floor discussion," are
81. Id at 63.
82. 195 N.L.R.B. at 199.
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not "calculated to form the basis for taking disciplinary or other job
affecting actions against [employees] for past misconduct."83 In Yel
low Freight Systems, Inc. ,84 the Board adopted an administrative law
judge's finding that Weingarten did not apply to a confrontation be
tween an employee and his superiors over a job assignment, a con
frontation that resulted in the employee's termination. In Yellow
Freight, the employee, a truck driver, refused to take an assigned run
because he believed that to do so would violate federal regulations. 85
During a twenty-minute discussion over whether federal regulations
did, in fact, permit his acceptance of the run, the employee allegedly
requested and allegedly was denied, the assistance and presence of
his union representative. 86 The administrative law judge found that
assuming, arguendo, the employee had requested representation, the
discussion did not fall within the purview of Weingarten since it was
neither an investigatory nor disciplinary interview. 87 The adminis
trative law judge also noted that the employee had sought the assist
ance of his representative not as a means of guarding against
possible discipline, but only to assist him in clarifying his job
duties. 88
Recently, a Board majority held that Weingarten rights did not
attach to a meeting called to read plant rules to employees. In North
west Engineering Co., 89 the employer, in response to what it per
ceived as a work slowdown, called a meeting of crew members. At
that meeting the employer distributed and read aloud its plant rules,
pointed out what it considered to be rules violations, and referred to
certain employees as rules violators. 9o In reversing the administra
83. 252 N.L.R.B. at 61.
84. 247 N.L.R.B. 177 (1980).
85. It!. at 179.
86. It!.
87. It!. at 182.
88. It!. That section 7 rights may therefore have attached to the confrontation in a
context other than that contemplated by Weingarten was not placed before, or decided
by, the Board. For example, it could be argued that the section 7 right to engage in
concerted activities for mutual aid or protection encompassed the right of the employee
to the assistance of his union agent for the purpose of pressing his claim to management
during the disagreement over the proper interpretation of the collective bargaining agree
ment. Cf. NLRB v. Interboro Contractors, 388 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1967) (concerted activ
ity may include filing complaints for solely personal reasons). Such "representation"
however, would not, as in Weingarten, be sought for the purpose of seeking protection
against a perceived threat to the employee's job interests.
89. 265 N.L.R.B. No. 26, 1982-83 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ~ 15,311, at 26,013 (Oct. 22,
1982). Chairman Van de Water, Member Fanning and Member Zimmerman composed
the majority. Members Jenkins and Hunter dissented.
90. It!., 1982-83 NLRB Dec. at 26,013-14.
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tive law judge's finding that the employer unlawfully denied an em
ployee's request that a union representative be allowed to attend the
meeting, the majority found that the meeting was informational only
and that no discipline was either contemplated or meted out in re
gard to the work slowdown. 91 Emphasizing that the exercise of the
Weingarten right should not interfere with legitimate employer pre
rogatives, the Board stated:
Weingarten rights do not arise simply because an employer calls a
meeting of its employees to discuss a perceived problem in the
way its employees are carrying out their duties. Work perform
ance is a matter of legitimate concern to an employer. An em
ployer surely retains the prerogative of calling a meeting of a
group of employees, at which no disciplinary action is contem
plated or taken, simply to advise them of the employer's valid
work performance expectations and to inform them of the possible
consequences of noncompliance, without invoking the spectre of
Weingarten .92
•

Nor was the character of the meeting changed, according to the ma
jority, by the fact that the employees were put on notice that future
violations of its rules could lead to discipline. 93 The Weingarten
rights, it admonished, "is not concerned with employees having rea
son to believe that discipline will be imposed for future offenses; it
relates to past conduct for which employees fear the imposition of
current sanctions."94
The Board requires that an employer-employee meeting be rea
sonably seen as forming the basis for taking disciplinary action over
past misconduct before the meeting will be held to give rise to a rea
sonable fear of discipline. The Board's position represents a balance
between the employee's need for protection against the employer
and the employer's right to engage in the day-to-day management of
its business by direction and supervision of its employees. The Wein
garten right, despite its importance, should come into play only
when the prospect of discipline is realistic, as evidenced by an ex
change concerning the imposition of discipline or subject matter for
which discipline might be imposed. This limitation, however, does
not mean that the Weingarten right applies only to meetings or ex
changes that are part of an employer'sformal disciplinary or investi
91. Id, 1982-83 NLRB Dec. at 26,014.
92. Id (footnote omitted).
93. Id
94. Id See a/so Stewart-Warner Corp., 253 N.L.R.B. 136, 161 (1980).
Plastics Division, Ball Corp., 257 N.L.R.B. 971 (1981).

q:
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gatory process. Once circumstances giving rise to a reasonable fear
of discipline are present, it matters not where or when the exchange
takes place or the manner in which it is conducted. 95 Nor should the
limitation that an employer-employee meeting must be calculated or
intended to form the basis for a possible disciplinary decision be
read to require that such purpose must exist prior to the meeting.
Confrontations or meetings may, during their course, change focus
and the right of an employee to protect his job interests through con
certed activity for mutual aid or protection should not depend on
whether a meeting, which in fact presents a reasonable fear of disci
pline, was not originally intended or calculated to do so.
The requirement that the employer-employee exchange present
circumstances giving rise to a reasonable fear of discipline is an im
portant aspect of the Weingarten right. Whether a reasonable fear of
discipline exists in regard to any employer-employee meeting is de
termined by "objective standards under all the circumstances of the
case"96 and not by the employee's subjective state of mind. It is im
portant to note, however, that "all the circumstances" are not limited
to those existing before or at the outset of the meeting. Rather, they
include the meeting itself which, depending on its nature, extent, or
purpose, may render irrelevant concerns that would otherwise be a
reasonable fear of discipline on the part of the employee. Northwest
Engineering serves as an illustration of this point. There, the em
ployee requesting the presence of the union agent at the outset of the
meeting did so under circumstances which, it could be argued, sup
ported a reasonable fear of discipline on the part of the employee.
However, given the fact that the employer, having denied the request
for representation, did not engage in any conduct which, in fact, con
cerned discipline over past misconduct, the employee's original fears,
reasonable or not, were viewed by the majority as irrelevant. 97 In
answering the assertion made by dissenting Members Jenkins and
Hunter, that the employer was not privileged to deny the request for
representation made by an employee who had a reasonable fear of
discipline in regard to the upcoming meeting,98 the majority stated:
95. See, e.g., AAA Equip. Servo Co., 238 N.L.R.B. 390 (1978), enforcement denied,
598 F.2d 1142 (8th Cir. 1979). The Board has found, however, that "location of an inter
view is one of the contributing factors in determining whether, under all of the circum
stances of a particular case, an employee reasonably believed that an interview might
result in his discipline." General Elec. Co., 240 N.L.R.B. 479, 481 n.12 (1979).
96. NLRB V. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. at 257 n.5; Quality Mfg. Co., 195
N.L.R.B. at 198 n.3.
97. 265 N.L.R.B. No. 26, 1982-83 NLRB Dec. at 26,015.
98. Id, 1982-83 NLRB Dec. at 26,017.
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The dissent errs in focusing exclusively on [the employees] fear
without taking into account the context of the meeting and its
stated purpose. An employee's fear of discipline cannot by itself
convert a meeting into a disciplinary or investigatory exercise. If
the meeting is not intended to be and in fact is not concerned with
discipline or an investigation into employee conduct, and the em
ployee is made aware of this either before or at the meeting, the
employee's fear to the contrary is immaterial. 99

The above is nothing more than a recognition of the fact that it
is the employer who controls the purpose, course, and extent of any
meeting and, therefore, it is the employer's actions that will deter
mine both whether an interview has taken place and whether Wein
garten rights attach to the interview. The corollary to this point is
that an employer denying a request for representation with regard to
any confrontation, in which an employee reasonably fears discipline,
acts at its peril if it fails to avoid a discussion to which section 7
rights would attach.
The situation in which the actual conduct or purpose of a meet
ing renders irrelevant a reasonable fear on the part of the employee
should, however, be contrasted with the situation in which the em
ployee acts on the basis of a reasonable fear and refuses to partici
pate absent the granting of his request. 100 In the former situation, it
cannot be determined whether the employee's section 7 right has
been restrained or coerced until the confrontation is over and its pur
pose and extent is analyzed in terms of section 7 guarantees. In the
latter situation, whether the confrontation or meeting presents a rea
sonable fear of discipline must be determined by the circumstances
at the time of refusal and if such reasonable fear exists, the intended
purpose of the meeting or the course the meeting would have taken
is irrelevant. This follows from the fact that the employee who re
fuses to participate on the basis of a reasonable fear of discipline is
seeking mutual aid or protection against a perceived threat and his
section 7 right to do so does not, ultimately, depend on the correct
ness of his perception. Rather, since the employer controls the pur
pose and the extent of the exchange, the burden shifts to the
employer should he choose to proceed, to assure the employee that
his fear however reasonable is unjustified and that no discipline will
result. 101
99. Id, 1982-83 NLRB Dec. at 26,017 n.4.
100. See, e.g., ILGWU v. Quality Mfg. Co., 420 U.S. 276 (1975).
101. The Board has found such assurances significant in determining whether cer
tain meetings required that requests for representation be granted. See Lennox Indus.,
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The Board has also interpreted the Weingarten right as it ap
plies to meetings or interviews which, while concerning employment
or discipline, occur after the employment relationship has been sev
ered. In such meetings, the issue arises as to whether an ex-em
ployee may invoke Weingarten rights. In Polson Industries, 102 the
Board adopted an administrative law judge~s finding that no section
7 rights to representation applied to a meeting held to discuss an
employee's voluntary termination. 103 The administrative law judge
found that the meeting had overtones of an investigatory interview
in that the management officials present could have altered the ex
employee's status by reinstating him. 104 However, given the fact that
the employee himself had terminated the employment relationship,
the administrative law judge reasoned:
To hold Weingarten applicable in the situation would expand the
rule to the point of making it applicable not only to employees
who reasonably expect to be disciplined as a result of the inter
. view but also to applicants for employment who also can expect
their employment status to be affected by the outcome of the
interview. lOS

As the employee in Polson had voluntarily severed the employ
ment relationship, the meeting therein concerned discipline only in
the sense that a decision not to rehire an ex-employee could be so
construed. The administrative law judge therefore correctly found
that the employee was nothing more than an applicant who had no
statutory right to compel the presence of a representative at the
meeting. 106 Discharged employees, it could be argued, should be
viewed differently by virtue of the fact that the meeting would neces
sarily concern reconsideration of the employer's decision to termi
nate the employment relationship: discipline in the sense
contemplated by Weingarten. However, Weingarten involves an em
ployer's prevention of the exercise of concerted activity for mutual
aid protection. Although the right to engage in such activity is
granted to employees in general, its exercise in the Weingarten con
text is only relevant as to active employees of the employer. 107 It is
244 N.L.R.B. 607 (1979), enforced, 637 F.2d 340 (5th Cir., Unit A 1981); General Elec.
Co., 240 N.L.R.B. 479 (1979); Amoco Chern. Corp. 237 N.L.R.B. 394 (1978).
102. 242 N.L.R.B. 1210 (1979).
103. Id
104. Id at 1212.
105. Id
106. Id
107. Applicants and ex-employees are employees under section 2(3) of the Act in
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the lack of active employee status that precludes any distinction be
tween employees who have been discharged, employees who have
quit, and applicants in regard to their ability to compel the em
ployer, as a function of section 7, to allow for the exercise of con
certed activity on his property. Thus, in Party Cookies, 108 the Board
adopted an administrative law judge's decision holding that a dis
charged employee had no section 7 right to representation at a meet
ing held subsequent to his discharge. 109
That Weingarten rights do not attach to meetings held subse
quent to but concerning an employee's discharge is supported by the
fact that a discharged employee cannot, in any reading of Wein
garten, be compelled to attend a post-discharge meeting. Although
the discharged employee may feel obligated to attend a post-dis
charge meeting for fear that the discipline will not receive favorable
reconsideration, he does not act out of a fear that his current status
will be adversely affected. Unlike the active employee, a discharged
employee cannot fear that his refusal to abide by his employer's
wishes may result in his losing that which he has already lost; only
that he may not regain that which he has already lost. I 10
3.

The Investigatory-Disciplinary Distinction

In its Weingarten opinion, the Supreme Court recognized that,
under the Texaco line of cases, the Board had found a statutory right
to union representation during disciplinary interviews. I I I As previ
ously discussed, I 12 that right ran to the employee under the section 7
guarantee that employees have the right to bargain through repre
sentatives of their own choosing and to the union, under the emthat they are protected from discrimination or retaliation for union related or other con
certed activity which they have engaged in, or might engage in, as employees of a partic
ular employer. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941). While a refusal to
hire, however, may constitute discrimination within the meaning of section 8(a)(3) of the
Act, or, by the message the refusal sends, restrain or coerce the section 7 rights of active
employees of the employer, it does not follow that section 7 requires an employer to
allow individuals who are not his employees a range of rights that have meaning only in
the job context.
108. 237 N.L.R.B. 612 (1978).
109. Id
110. It should be noted that the discussion herein relates only to whether the sec
tion 7 right to engage in concerted activity for mutual aid or protection attaches to such
meetings between an employer and an ex-employee. Since such a meeting could have
grievance ramifications, a union may have rights in regard thereto either under section
8(a)(5) or section 9(a) of the Act. See infra text accompanying notes 135-60 for a discus
sion of Baton Rouge Water Works Co., 246 N.L.R.B. 995 (1979).
111. 420 U.S. at 260.
112. See supra text accompanying notes 18-36.
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ployer's section 8(a)(5) obligation to bargain in good faith. As also
discussed,l13 the rationale of Texaco required differentiation be
tween those interviews involving discipline and, therefore, a bargain
ing obligation, and those possibly leading to, but not yet involving
discipline-investigatory interviews. Unfortunately, few interviews
between employers and employees lend themselves readily to classi
fication as purely investigatory or disciplinary.114 In many inter
views that could otherwise be termed investigatory, discipline is not
postponed until a later date but is imposed after questioning is com
pleted and the employer is satisfied that the employee is guilty of
misconduct or poor performance. In other interviews, discipline has
tentatively been decided upon and the employee is called to explain
his actions or to present mitigating factors. In still others, the disci
plinary decision that has been made is, to an extent, irrevocable and
the employee is summoned only to be given and/or discuss the rea
sons therefore. The problem of classifying interviews as either inves
tigatory or disciplinary is also compounded by the fact that an
interview that could be classified as disciplinary only does not neces
sarily constitute the end of the disciplinary process. Rather, in many
cases the disciplinary interview is only the beginning of a grievance
process, the end result of which could be affected by what transpires
during the alleged disciplinary or exit interview.
In each of the above cases, an employee's request for assistance
or representation represents the seeking of aid or protection against
possible or actual adverse action by his employer. Thus, given the
Weingarten holding that the section 7 right to engage in concerted
activity for mutual aid or protection applies to an investigatory inter
view, one which holds out only the possibility of discipline, it follows
that the same right adheres to an interview during which discipline is
actually imposed.
In Mount Vernon Tanker Co. ,llS the Board so found, holding
that a seaman had a section 7 right to refuse to attend a logging
session absent his requested representative. I 16 Likewise, in Cert!fied
Grocers of California, 117 a Board panel held that the section 7 right
113. Id.
114. Although in denying enforcement of Texaco, the Fifth Circuit disagreed with
the Board and found the interview at issue to be investigatory, not disciplinary. Texaco
Inc., Houston Producing Div. v. NLRB, 408 F.2d 142, 145 (5th Cir. 1969).
115. 218 N.L.R.B. 1423 (1975), enforcement denied, 549 F.2d 571 (9th Cir. 1977).
116. Id.
117. 227 N.L.R.B. 1211 (1977), enforcement denied, 587 F.2d 449 (9th Cir. 1978);
accord Alfred M. Lewis Inc., 229 N.L.R.B. 757 (1977), enforcement denied in part, 587
F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1978).
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to engage in concerted activities for mutual aid or protection encom
passes a right to representation at an interview held to inform an
employee of a previously determined disciplinary decision. I IS
There, the employer had reached a decision to discipline an em
ployee for poor performance. During an interview with the plant
manager, who had no authority to alter the discipline, the em
ployee's two requests for union representation were denied. The
plant manager told the employee that his record had been reviewed
and that his performance had not improved. After denying the em
ployee's request to see his records, the plant manager gave the em
ployee a disciplinary layoff notice. The meeting ended with the
employee asking what was expected of him and with the manager
responding that the employee should "do [his] job.""9 The panel
majority120 rejected the employer's argument that, under the
Supreme Court's decision in Weingarten, a questioning or attempt to
obtain evidence from the employee must take place for an interview
to come within the protective ambit of section 7.'21 The majority
noted that the Supreme Court in Weingarten had not expressly lim
ited its holding to investigatory interviews and had, in fact, affirmed
the Board's interpretation of the right to representation which, as de
veloped, had never been so limited. 122 The majority also rejected the
contention made by dissenting Member Walther that no need existed
for a representative in a situation in which the interview was not
held "for the purpose of eliciting facts or permitting the employee to
explain and/or defend conduct. ..."123 Rather, the majority noted
that the employer had engaged in "some discussion" of the em
ployee's work and, therefore, had presented an opportunity for the
exercise of the employee's right to seek and have assistance. 124 Fur
ther, the majority noted that the principles enunciated by the
Supreme Court in Weingarten were equally applicable to the inter
view involved in the case:
The presence of [the employee's] union stewart might have re
sulted in his apprising [the employee] of his rights, and how much
support he could expect from his representative. Also, the union
118.
119.
120.
Penello.
121.

227 N.L.R.B. at 1213.
Id at 1211-12.
The majority was composed of Member Fanning and former Member
Former Member Walther dissented.
227 N.L.R.B. at 1212.
122. Id at 1214.
123. Id at 1216.
124. Id at 1214.
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representative might have elicited information that would be nec
essary for the protection of the interests of the other employees in
the unit, a concern expressed in the Weingarten decision. )25

Thus, the majority applied to disciplinary interviews, where the
right to representation had originated as a function of the bargaining
obligation, the mutual aid or protection theory it had used in Quality
Manlffacturing and Mobil 011, to extend a right to representation to
investigatory interviews. )26
The Board's holding that the section 7 right to representation
\. affirmed by the Supreme Court in Weingarten and Quality Manlffac
turing applied to any interview to which the reasonable fear of disci
pline attaches and not merely those containing an element of
investigation, met with disagreement in courts of appeals, )27 particu
larly the Ninth Circuit, which denied enforcement of Mount Vernon
Tanker Co. v. NLRB,J28 Alfred M. Lewis, Inc. v. NLRB,)29 and
NLRB v. Certified Grocers)30 on the issue. In Alfred M. Lewis, the
court held that the right to representation arose only when a "signifi
cant purpose of the interview is to obtain facts to support discipli
nary action that is probable or is being seriously considered")3) and
that, absent an investigatory element, "the protective role of the
union representative envisioned by Weingarten is not applicable."J32
In denying enforcement of Certtfted Grocers, the court found that the
purpose of the meeting was not to elicit facts supporting the em
ployer's disciplinary decision or hear the employee's side of the story
with a view toward withholding discipline. 133 Rather, noting the
Board's finding that the sole purpose of the meeting was to deliver a
warning notice, the court held that no discussion or consultation
125. Id at 1215 (footnote omitted).
126. Id at 1212-13. The holding that the right to act in concert for mutual aid or
protection applies to all "interviews" in which the employee reasonably fears discipline
eliminates not only the distinction between investigatory and disciplinary interviews, but
also eliminates any need to analyze the employee's request in terms of the section 7 right
of employees to bargain collectively through their chosen representative: the theory used
in Texaco. The Board has not since used the Texaco analysis to find a right to represen
tation at any "disciplinary" interview. The Board, however, has never explicitly rejected
the theory.
127. See, e.g., Anchortank, Inc., v. NLRB, 618 F.2d 1153 (5th Cir. 1980); NLRB v.
Columbia Univ., 541 F.2d 922 (2d Cir. 1976).
128. 549 F.2d 571 (9th Cir. 1977). The lack of an investigatory element was an
alternate ground upon which the court denied enforcement. Id at 574.
129. 587 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1978).
130. 587 F.2d 449 (9th Cir. 1978).
131. 587 F.2d at 410.
132. Id at 411.
133. Id at 451.
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took place. 134
In Baton Rouge Water Works Co. ,135 a Board majority retreated
from Certified Grocers and adopted the Ninth Circuit's view. In that
case, the employer decided to fire a probationary employee. The
employee was summoned to her supervisor's office who told her that
she was "not working out." The employee inquired whether she was
being fired and was told by the supervisor that it would be in the best
interest of the company if it were her last day of employment. The
employee then protested that the discharge was unfair and requested
union representation. The request was denied. Subsequently, the
office manager and assistant personnel manager entered the office
and a discussion with employee ensued over the reasons for her ter
mination and her alleged poor performance. 136
In a plurality opinion, a Board majority composed of Member
Jenkins, former Member Truesdale, and former Member Murphy,
held that Weingarten rights did not attach to the interview. 137 Mem
ber Jenkins and former Member Truesdale held that, to the extent
that Certified Grocers provided a right to representation at an inter
view in which an employee was merely informed that he was being
disciplined, the case had been wrongly decided on its facts and was
overruled. 138 Rather, they found that the Weingarten right did not
apply to a meeting held "solely for the purpose of informing the em
ployee of, and acting upon, a previously made disciplinary. deci
sion."139 They specifically emphasized, however, that they were not
resurrecting the distinction between investigatory and disciplinary
interviews which was abandoned in Certified Grocers:
We stress that we are not holding today that there is no right to the
presence of a union representative at any "disciplinary" interview.
Indeed, if the employer engages in any conduct beyond metely
informing the employee of a previously made disciplinary deci
sion, the full panoply of protections accorded the employee under
Weingarten may be applicable. Thus, for example were the em
ployer to inform the employee of a disciplinary action and then
seek facts or evidence in support of that action, or to attempt to
have the employee admit his alleged wrongdoing or to sign a
134. Id
135. 246 N.L.R.B. 995 (1979).
136. Id at 995.
137. Id at 998. Former Chairman Fanning and former Member Penello each filed
a dissent.
138. Id at 997.
139. Id
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statement to that effect, or to sign statements relating to such mat
ters as workmen's compensation, such conduct would remove the
meeting from the narrow holding of the instant case, and the em
ployee's right to union representation would attach. In contrast,
the fact that the employer and employee thereafter engaged in a
conversation at the employee's behest or instigation concerning
the reasons for the previously determined disciplined will not,
alone, convert the meeting to an interview at which the Wein
garten protections apply.140
The significance of Member Jenkins' and former Member Trues
dale's opinion lay in their refusal to find that the discussion regard
ing the employee's work performance and the reasons for the
termination did not, in any way, add to the act of disciplining and
thereby create an interview to which Weingarten rights attached.
Thus, they viewed the interview in Baton Rouge Water to be no dif
ferent from the type of confrontation involved in both Gypsum 141
and Amoco Oi/ 142 where the Board found that the employers therein
had engaged in nothing more than a ministerial act. 143 What led
Member Jenkins and former Member Truesdale to find no signifi
cance in the discussion was not simply the employer's failure to seek
facts or evidence in support of the discipline or an admission from
the employee, but also that the discussion occurred in the context of
previously determined discipline. 144 Since the employer had reached
a "final, binding decision"145 to discharge the employee, the subse
quent discussion was viewed as being incapable of affecting the out
come and any attempt at concerted activity as being meaningless. 146
They specifically rejected the contention that the presence of the rep
resentative would address any of the concerns expressed m
Weingarten.
Contrary to the contention of the majority in Certified Grocers,
such a conversation or discussion between the employer and em
ployee does not require the presence of a union representative to
inform the employee of his rights and the support the employee
140. Id (footnote omitted).
141. See supra text accompanying notes 72-73.
142. See supra text accompanying notes 74-75.
143. The same could be argued regarding the Ninth Circuit's denial of enforce
ment of the Board's decisions in Mount Vernon, A!fred M Lewis, and Cert(/ied Grocers.
The court viewed such cases as representing no more than the act of imposing discipline,
notwithstanding any discussion that may have occurred.
144. 246 N.L.R.B. at 997.
145. Id
146. Id
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might expect from the union, or to elicit information necessary for
the protection of the interests of the other employees in the unit.
Once a disciplinary decision has been made by the employer, the
proper forum for the discussion and evaluation of that discipli
nary action shifts to the grievance procedure. Unlike an interview
at which no formal action is taken by the employer, the invocation
of discipline by the employer automatically subjects that decision
to the grievance procedure, during which all the events surround
ing the disciplinary action can be examined and evaluated by the
union, and a decision made by the union as to the best course of
action to be taken in light of the interests of all of the employees in
the unit. 147

In a separate concurring opinion, former Member Murphy ex
pressed no significant disagreement. Stating her opinion that Wein
garten required that the Board maintain a real distinction between
investigatory interviews and disciplinary actions, 148 she found that
the Weingarten right attached to any interview, whether it was called
investigatory or disciplinary, in which information is sought from
the employee. 149 Likewise, she found that a conference called to ap
prise an employee of adverse action or the reasons therefore did not
amount to an investigatory interview, even if an "employee's protes
tations result in an extended confrontation with representatives of
management and discussion is consequently expanded to include
specific examples of employee misfeasance."IS0
I dissented from the majority decision in Baton Rouge Water. 151
As I viewed the matter, the work performance discussion therein
converted an otherwise ministerial act into an interview to which
section 7 rights attached; a result of the fact that the discussion
presented the opportunity for concerted activity designed to counter
the disciplinary action. In this regard, the fact that the employee
instigated the discussion should be of no relevance. 1S2 The meeting
147. Id at 997 n.6.
148. Id at 998 (Member Murphy, concurring).
149. Id
150. Id
151. Id at 999-1000 (former Chairman Fanning, dissenting). In a separate dissent,
former Member Penello outlined the development of the Weingarten right, pointing out
that Weingarten represented an extension of the right to representation from "discipli
nary" interviews to "investigatory" interviews. Id at 1000 (former Member Penello, dis
senting). Former Member Penello thus argued that the effect of the majority's decision
was to remove from employees a section 7 right that existed before the Weingarten deci
sion and upon which the Weingarten right was based. Id
152. Nor did the majority actually consider the employee's instigation of the dis
cussion to be relevant. In Texaco, Inc., 246 N.L.R.B. 1021 (1979), a companion case to
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had not been concluded and the employer, who could have cut off
the employee's protestations and inquiries, chose not to do SO.153
The Baton Rouge Water decision is significant because of the
majority's questionable reliance on the facts that the employer had
decided to impose discipline before the meeting and that the plant
manager who conducted the meeting had no authority to alter the
discipline. For although the exchange between the employee and
her superiors might not have changed the particular outcome of the
meeting, the exchange still may have affected both the employer's
decision to adhere subsequently to the announced disciplinary deci
sion and its actions in regard to that decision. As the majority recog
nized, the disciplinary interview was not the end of the disciplinary
process. 154 Rather, it was only the beginning of a grievance proce
dure during which the employer would be called on to adhere to its
decision and thus, the discipline imposed at the meeting was not, as
the majority characterized it, "final and binding."155 Since the work
performance discussion potentially could affect the employer's re
solve to adhere to the discipline, the statutory concerns underlying
the Weingarten right were no less applicable. Similarly, any assist
ance rendered to the employee in the discussion would be consistent
with the role of representative as envisioned by the Court in Wein
garten. Could not the representative have presented extenuating
factors or elicited facts favorable to the employee who may have
been too fearful or inarticulate to do so herself? Could not the repre
sentative have assisted the employee in voicing her contention that
her discharge was unfair or in countering the employer's contentions
as to her alleged faulty performance and its opinion that she was not
Baton Rouge Water, the majority relied on Baton Rouge Water and found that no section
7 right attached to meetings called to inform employees of previously determined disci
plinary decisions and to afford the employees an opportunity to explain or defend them
selves. Id. at 1022. The majority found it critical that the opportunity provided the
employees could not have changed the result of the meeting and that, by the offer, the
employer was not attempting to obtain information in support of any decision. In Tex
aco, Inc., the Baton Rouge Water majority made it clear that they were requiring the
existence of an investigatory element before Weingarten rights attached to any employer
employee confrontation. Id. at 1021.
153. Compare the concurring opinion of former Chairman Fanning and former
Member Penello in Texaco Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 633 (1980), enforced, 659 F.2d 124 (9th
Cir. 1981) and Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 251 N.L.R.B. 612, 614 n.4 (1980), enforcement
denied, 667 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1981), with 246 N.L.R.B. at 1000 (former Chairman Fan
ning, dissenting).
154. 246 N.L.R.B. at 997 n.6.
155. Id. at 997.
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working out? Could not such assistance have caused the employer to
reconsider and question its initial decision?
Even in the absence of a formal grievance procedure following
discipline, situations arise in which an employer is called upon to
reconsider or reaffirm an announced disciplinary action and the rea
sons therefore. A discussion taking place during the imposition of
discipline may affect an employer's recommendation to other em
ployers, its own consideration of the employee for reemployment, or
its position with regard to an unemployment compensation claim. In
cases where the discipline is less than discharge, the discussion may
have bearing on how the employer views the employee's work and
disciplinary history or treats similar transgressions.
An employer's actions with regard to any of its disciplinary de
cisions raises real, job related concerns indistinguishable from and of
no less importance than those raised by the prospect of the discipline
itself. Concerted activity aimed at addressing and alleviating those
concerns is no less for the purpose of mutual aid or protection. ls6 It
was the Baton Rouge Water majority's refusal to give weight to such
post-decision concerns which led it therein to unduly restrict the
scope of section 7 as it relates to confrontations between employers
and employees which concern the imposition of discipline. ls7
The Baton Rouge Water decision also leaves open the issue of
whether a right to at least union representation would attach to the
type of meeting involved therein as a function of the section 7 right
of employees to bargain through representatives of their own choos
ing, as well as the issue of whether a union would have section
8(a)(5) rights to be present. In concluding that Weingarten rights did
not apply to the factual situation present, the majority concluded
only that section 7 right to engage in concerted activity for mutual
aid or protection did not require that the employer grant the em
ployee's request for union representation. As discussed previously,
the Board had, under the pre- Weingarten, Texaco line of cases,
found that a right to representation at disciplinary interviews existed
as the function of a union's status as exclusive bargaining representa
tive, and the concomitant section 7 right of employees to be repre
sented thereby.ls8 Given the work performance discussion which
156. The value of representation is diminished if relegated to the grievance proce
dure. As the Court noted in Weingarten, "[t]he employer may then be more concerned
with justifying his actions than re-examining them." 420 U.S. at 264.
157. At least one federal court of appeals has cited Baton Rouge Water with ap
proval. See Anchortank, Inc. v. NLRB, 618 F.2d 1153, 1167 (5th Cir. 1980).
158. See supra text accompanying notes 28-3\.
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took place in Baton Rouge Water, it would appear that the meeting
conducted therein, in terms of both its extent and purpose, was no
different than the meeting held in the original Texaco decision
where the Board stated:
Thus it is clear that on November 17 the Company sought to deal
directly with [the employee] concerning matters affecting his terms
and conditions of employment. Yet as noted, the employees in the
unit had selected the Union to deal with the [company] on such
matters and there is evidence that either [the employee]-assum
ing he could have done so-<>r the Union had waived to any ex
tent the right to representation or had agreed to channelize
disputes concerning such right into the procedures of the contract
grievance provisions. Consequently,. . . the [company's] refusal
to respect [the employee's] request that the bargaining representa
tive be permitted to represent him at the meeting interfered with
and restrained him in the exercise of his rights guaranteed by Sec
tion 7 of the Act. 159

Whether the present Board would be disposed to apply a right
to union representation to a Baton Rouge Water-type meeting, one
which would inure both to the union and the employee as a function
of the bargaining obligations must, of course, await a case which
properly presents the issue. By means of this discussion, I seek only
to raise the issue apd do not imply how I, as a Board member, would
decide it. Any decision to again apply the rationale of Texaco to
meetings or interviews held for the purpose of imposing discipline
would require that the Board, in considering the competing interests
of the employer, employee, and the union, take into account the
present existence of Weingarten right as developed by the Board. 160

B. The Request
As developed by the Board, the Weingarten right is the section 7
right to engage in concerted activity for mutual aid or protection
159. 168 N.L.R.B. at 362.
160. In Weingarten, the Supreme Court majority noted the existence of the Texaco
line of cases, but expressed neither agreement nor disagreement with the Texaco ration
ale. 420 U.S. at 264. Dissenting Justices Powell and Stewart, however, did express
doubts as to the correctness of the Texaco rationale. See id. at 271 n.3. In this regard,
compare the Fifth Circuit's decision denying enforcement of Texaco, 408 F.2d at 145
(employee had no right to union representation at an investigatory interview simply be
cause employer had previously committed itself to disciplining the employees) witlt its
discussion of the Baton Rouge Water and Texaco line of cases in Anchortank, Inc. v.
NLRB, 618 F.2d 1153, 1168 (5th Cir. 1980) (no right to representation at an interview
condu,cted solely to inform employee of predetermined disciplinary decision).
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during certain interviews or meetings at which the reasonable fear of
discipline obtains. Since it is an employee right, it must be invoked
by request. 161 Absent such request, nothing in the Act requires an
employer to allow a representative at such meetings. It is for the
employees, not the employer, to determine whether concerted activ
ity is undertaken in response to any employer action.
The nature of the Weingarten right requires that it be invoked
only by the employee who reasonably fears discipline. The right to
engage in concerted activity for mutual aid protection does not re
quire an employer to permit the representation of an unwilling em
ployee. However, it is not necessary that the employee himself make
the request to the employer. All that should be required is that the
request be authorized by the employee or that, in the face of a re
quest, the employee indicate his willingness to be represented and
thereby adopt the request. 162
That one's right to representation or assistance may not be in
voked by others does not necessarily mean that employee attempts to
represent other employees necessarily fall outside the protective am
bit of section 7. A request to represent or assist an employee is no
less an attempt to engage in concerted activity for mutual aid or pro
tection than is a request to be represented. Thus, in Quality Manu
facturing the Board found that two union stewards who sought to
represent an employee at an investigatory interview were engaged in
concerted activity protected by section 7 and could not be disciplined
for their attempts. 163
A request, to be valid, must be made or communicated to the
management official who is conducting the interview or meeting or is
161. 420 U.s. at 257. See also Materials Research Co., 262 N.L.R.B. No. 122, 110
L.R.R.M. 1401, 1403 n.1O (1982); Kohl's Food Co., 249 N.L.R.B. 75 (1980); General
Motors Assembly Div., 245 N.L.R.B. 1186 (1979); Inland Container Corp., 240 N.L.R.B.
1298 (1979); Greyhound Lines Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. 849 (1978).
162. See, e.g., Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 262 N.L.R.B. No. 127, 110 L.R.R.M. 1411,
1412 n.5 (1982). Cf. Appalachian Power Co., 253 N.L.R.B. 931 (1980) (union representa
tive cannot invoke Weingarten rights on behalf of employee).
163. 195 N.L.R.B. at 199.
In Quality Mfg., the stewards insisted upon representing an employee who at the
same time, insisted on being represented. Id at 197-98. Therefore, the stewards and the
employee were engaged in concerted activity and thus should be protected by section 7.
Section 7 should also provide some limited protection to attempts to represent an unwill
ing employee. At least until the time that the offer of assistance is rejected by the em
ployee, the union employee who seeks to provide the assistance is attempting to engage
in concerted activity and his right to do so should not depend on his lack of success.
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capable of granting the request. l64 However, an employee who
makes a valid request on the plant floor need not repeat it at the
office. 165
In Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 166 the Board determined
what constitutes a valid request for representation. There, four em
ployees were called to investigatory interviews. During their inter
views, one employee asked whether union representation was
needed and another stated that he would like to have "someone
there to explain . . . what was happening."167 During a group dis
cussion of the incident being investigated, one of the employees
again asked about calling in the union. 168 A Board majorityl69 re
versed the administrative law judge's finding that none of the em
ployees had made a clear, unequivocal request for representation,
finding instead that the request for someone was all that Weingarten
required to invoke the right to representation. 170 The majority also
found that the other statements, though less forthright, constituted
valid requests for representation in that they were "sufficient to put
the Employer on notice as to the employees' desires."171
Once a valid request for representation has been made, an em
ployer must grant the request, exercise its legitimate prerogative to
discontinue the attempted interview,172 or offer the employee the
choice of attending the interview unassisted or having no interview
at all. 173 Unless the employee voluntarily agrees to remain after hav
ing been offered the choice, or is otherwise aware of it, the employer
164. See Appalachian Power Co., 253 N.L.R.B. 931, 934 (1980); Lennox Indus.,
Inc., 244 N.L.R.B. 607, 609 (1979).
165. Roadway Express, Inc., 246 N.L.R.B. 1127, 1128 (1979); Lennox Indus., Inc.,
244 N.L.R.B. 607, 608 (1979).
166. 227 N.L.R.B. 1223 (1977).
167. Id
168. Id at 1225 (Members Penello and Walther, dissenting).
169. Former Chairman Murphy, Member Fanning and Member Jenkins com
posed the majority. Former Members Penello and Walther dissented.
170. 227 N.L.R.B. at 1223.
171. Id A request for a "witness" is sufficient. Good Samaritan Nursing Home,
Inc., 250 N.L.R.B. 207 (1980). Bu/ see Levingston Shipbuilding Co., 249 N.L.R.B. I
(1980). In Levings/on, an employee's statements concerning a "lawyer" were interpreted
as going toward legal representation in court and not toward representation of any type
at the interview. Id at I n.2. Of course, representation by a private lawyer is not
equivalent to union representation as the lawyer cannot claim the status of serving the
interests of the entire bargaining unit. See Sentry Investigation Corp., 249 N.L.R.B. 926,
936 n.20 (1980).
172. 420 U.S. at 258.
173. Id
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may not proceed without violating section 8(a)(I),l14
While a request need be only sufficient to put the employer on
notice of the employee's desire for representation, the above-de
scribed options available to an employer faced with a request for
representation presume the ability to comply with the request. How
ever, depending upon their phrasing, not all requests for representa
tion can, in fact, be complied with. For example, a specific
individual requested as the representative may not be available. In
such circumstances, the Board has found that the employer is not
necessarily limited to the option of forgoing the interview or offering
the employee the choice of an interview without assistance or no in
terview at all. 175 Rather, in cases involving the unavailability of a
union representative in general or a particular person sought as a
representative, the Board has balanced the employee's interest in ob
taining representation and the employer's interest in conducting the
interview without interference or delay.
In Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles, 176 an employee called
to an investigatory interview requested the presence of his union
steward who, the employee knew, was on vacation. 177 The adminis
trative law judge found that, by the request, the employee was at
tempting to postpone the interview l78 and concluded that, under
Weingarten, the employer had no obligation to do so. A Board ma
jorityl79 adopted the administrative law judge's decision stating:
[T]here is nothing the Supreme Court's opinion in Weingarten
which indicates that an employer must postpone interviews with
its employees because a particular union representative, here the
shop steward, is unavailable either for personal or other reasons
for which the employer is not responsible, where another repre
sentative is available whose presence could have been requested
by the employee in the absent representative's place. Indeed, the
Supreme Court was careful to point out that the exercise by em
ployees of the right to representation at an interview may not in
174. Good Samaritan Nursing Home, Inc., 250 N.L.R.B. 207, 209 (1980); United
States Postal Serv., 241 N.L.R.B. 141, 141 (1979).
175. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 227 N.L.R.B. 1276, 1276 (1977).
176. 227 N.L.R.B. 1276 (1977).
177. Id
178. Id at 1279. The fact that the employee was attempting to postpone the inter
view would serve as an independent basis for denying the request for representation as
the employee was not actually seeking representation. Obviously, Weingarten rights
should not be used as a shield against discipline through an insistence on representation
by a specific unavailable person.
179. The majority was composed of former Chairman Murphy and former Mem
bers Penello and Walther.
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terfere with legitimate employer prerogatives. Certainly the right
to hold interviews of this type without delay is a legitimate em
ployer prerogative. The fact that "it would not have been a disas
ter" to postpone the meeting to await [the steward's] return is
therefore immaterial. I80

The majority decision in Coca-Cola represents more than a
mere balancing of the employer's interest in conducting the inter
view without delay or interference and the employee's interest in be
ing represented. In finding that the employer was privileged to
conduct the interview, the majority relied heavily on the fact that,
given the unavailability of the particular steward, the employee did
not request or propose an alternative:
In fact, Respondent never denied [the employee's] request; it was
simply unable to comply therewith. When [the employee] was in
formed of this fact, he did not, as he could have, request alterna
tive representation. We see nothing in Weingarten which implies
that it is the employer's obligation to suggest and/or secure alter
native representation where the representative originally re
quested by the employee is unavailable. 181

Member Jenkins and I dissented. First, we found the fact that
the interview was postponed until the steward returned "would not
have been a disaster," according to the employer, dictated that the
proper balance between the employer's interests and the employee's
be struck in favor of granting the employee's request. 182 This was
especially true since the result was that the employee was inter
viewed without the benefit of any representation at all. 183 In this
regard, we took issue with the majority's placing the burden of pro
posing or securing an alternative to the requested, unavailable stew
ard on the employee and not the employer. l84 Unlike the majority,
we viewed the employee's request for the steward as a request for
help which, although phrased in terms of the assistance of a particu
lar union agent, was not necessarily limited thereto. As such, the
request was, in fact, capable of being complied with by the employer
and absent an attempt to comply, was not the employee's obligation
to sort the matter out:
180. 227 N.L.R.B. at 1276 (footnote omitted).
181. Id. (footnote omitted).
182. Id. at 1277 (Members Jenkins & Fanning, dissenting).
183. Id. at 1276. The issue, therefore, was whether the employee was to be ac
corded representation, not whether the employee would have his choice of
representative.
184. Id. at 1277 (Members Jenkins & Fanning, dissenting).
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[The employee] did not request any alternative union representa
tion and this factor appears to have influenced the Administrative
Law Judge considerably; he apparently concluded that because
there was a business agent available [the employee] should have
asked for and been content with him. We do not agree.
To put the burden of all this on the employee, as our col
leagues do, is completely to negate the purpose of Weingarten. It
is because employees are not skilled in the niceties of procedure
that they need help. Weingarten holds that the employee is enti
tled to such help ifhe asks for it. [The employee] asked. The help
was denied, and Respondent proceeded to do what Weingarten
says it cannot do-to conduct the interview with the unassisted
employee who had not been informed of his rights. The case is as
simple as that and the violation plain.18s
In Coca-Cola, the alternate union representative was not at the
site and this fact might serve to explain why the employer was found
to have no burden to suggest or supply such representative in place
ofthe absent steward. In a subsequent case, however, another Board
majority indicated that, even given the presence of a number of
union agents on the scene, an employer was under no obligation to
suggest alternatives when the specific representative requested by the
employee was absent at the time of the interview. In Roadway Ex
press, Inc. ,186 the union had designated a number of alternate com
mitteemen to represent employees during the absence of the regular·
committeeman. An employee called to an interview concerning an
acrimonious exchange with his supervisor stated that he would not
attend because his committeeman had gone home ill. 187 There was
no evidence that, at the time of his refusal, the employee was aware
of the union's designation of alternate committeemen.
Relying on Coca-Cola, the majority reversed the administrative
law judge's finding that the employer had violated section 8(a)(1) by
summarily suspending the employee for refusing to attend the inter
view. 188 In so concluding, the majority found that the employee had,
in fact, been apprised of the existence of an alternate committeeman,
albeit as the employee was leaving the plant, but had rejected such
an option. 189 However, the majority also went on to state that it
185.
186.
composed
187.
188.
189.

Id
246 N.L.R.B. 1127 (1979). Former Members Penello, Murphy and Truesdale
the majority. Member Jenkins and Chairman Fanning dissented.
Id at 1135.
Id at 1130.
Id This finding was, at best, dubious in light of the surrounding circum
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would have reached the same result even if the employees had not
been so informed:
Even accepting the premisc that [the employee] was not made
aware [of the alternate committeeman's status as such] when he
initially refused representation by him, we nevertheless adhere to
our finding that no violation occurred as we believe that the bur
den of informing unit members of the designation of union offi
cials is one more appropriately borne by the bargaining agent.
Here the Union appointed the three alJernate committeemen spe
cifically so that no night-shift employee would be without repre
sentation if the need arose. We would, therefore, not hold
Respondent accountable for the Union's failure to shoulder its ap
propriate obligation in this situation. 19o

Member Jenkins and I dissented as we had in Coca-Cola, ques
tioning as well as the majority's reliance on the union's actions:
Finally, we disagree with the majority's assertion that the Union's
failure to announce [the alternate committeeman's] appointment
may operate to [the employee's] detriment. In appointing the
committeemen, the Union was attempting to afford night-shift
employees additional representation. The Union had no such ob
ligation to do so, and it is clear that, in the absence of any repre
sentative at the plant at the time of the interview, an employer
must respect the employee's request for assistance, even if it means
delaying the interview. Consequently, the majority has turned the
Union's voluntary attempt to assist the employees into a pitfall,
causing them to be deprived of protections formerly available. 191

To the extent that Coca-Cola and Roadway Express relieve an
employer of the obligation to afford any representation to an em
ployee who requests, by name, representation by an individual who
happens to be unavailable, these decisions distort the Weingarten
right and seriously limit the exercise thereof. The right is distorted
stances. Significantly, the employee allegedly was not apprised of the presence of the
alternate committeeman until after the employee had been sent home and was in the
process of leaving the plant. Id How the employee's right to insist upon representation
when called to the interview could be dependent on subsequent developments was an
issue not addressed by the majority.
190. Id
191. Id at 1133 (footnote omitted). An employer's right not to delay an interview
due to the absence of a specifically requested representative, when the employer provides
or proposes an alternative, is discussed below. See infra text accompanying notes 193
203. In Roadway Express, however, the requested representative was due to arrive within
one half hour of the incident. As a result of the employer's failure to obtain or propose
an alternate, the employee was faced with the prospect of being interviewed without any
representation. 246 N.L.R.B. at 1137.
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because a request for representation framed in terms of the represen
tation or assistance of a particular person is no less a request for
representation than one framed in general terms. Nothing inherent
in such a request indicates that the employee desires representation
by the requested individual to the exclusion of all others. Absent
evidence that the employee in fact desires only representation by the
person he names, an employer should not be allowed to seize upon
the absence or unavailability of the requested individual to deny the
request and stand silent, hoping that the employee will fail to ask for
an alternative. If Southwestern Bell is of any value as precedent, that
option is not available to an employer faced with an employee's re
quest for a particular representative and should not arise merely be
cause the employee happens to know and mention the name of his
union steward. Further, no legitimate employer interest exists in
support of such an option.
Apart from the issue of where the burden of proposing or secur
ing alternative representation lies, Coca-Cola and Roadway Express
stand for the proposition that, given the availability of alternative
representation, the employee is not guaranteed his choice of repre
sentative. Rather, the Board will balance the employee's desires
against the employer's interest in proceeding without delay and in
terference. For example, in Crown Zellerbach, Inc. ,192 the Board
adopted an administrative law judge's finding that the employer did
not violate the Weingarten right when it failed to grant an em
ployee's request for a union representative and instead provided the
assistance of a fellow employee who was the most visible and active
union adherent and who had been acting as the de facto spokesman
for the employees. 193 There, the union had been recently certified
and had not yet designated any stewards at the employer's plant.
Further, the nearest union official was sixty miles away.194 Under
such circumstances, the administrative law judge found that the em
ployer had done all it reasonably could be expected to do. He noted
that it was the employer who offered the assistance of the union ac
tivist and thereby was attempting to comply with the request for rep
resentation rather than overpower the lone employee. He further
noted that the employee had accepted the employer's offer of alter
native representation and that the union activist had, in fact, pro
192. 239 N.L.R.B. 1124 (1978). The fact that the employer had offered, and the
employee had accepted, the alternate representation, id. at 1127, made the case readily
distinguishable from Coca-Cola, upon which the administrative law judge had relied.
193. Id. at 1124.
194. Id. at 1126.
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vided the assistance and representation contemplated by the
Supreme Court in Weingarten .195
The Board engaged in similar balancing in Pac!fic Gas & Electric
Co. 196 There, in response to a request for union representation by a
union steward subjected to an investigatory interview, the employer
provided the other union steward present at the site. However, the
employee objected to representation by that particular steward since
the steward was friendly with the management official conducting
the interview, was being considered for a management position at
the time of the interview, and had expressed a reluctance to get in
volved in the matter. The employee instead insisted upon being rep
resented by a fellow steward located at a site five miles away.197 A
Board panel,198 with Member Jenkins dissenting, adopted the ad
ministrative law judge's decision that the employer was under no ob
ligation to postpone the interview in order to obtain the requested
off-site steward stating:
The Supreme Court in Weingarten neither stated nor suggested
that an employee's interests can only be safeguarded by the pres
ence of a spec!fic representative sought by the employee. To the
contrary, the focus of the decision is on the employee's right to the
presence of a union representative designated by the union to rep
resent all employees. 199
The majority rejected the contention that the proximity of the re
quested steward made both stewards equally available. Further, in
discounting the importance of the employee's need to be represented
by a steward in whom he had confidence, the majority argued that
granting the employee's request for the off-site steward would, in ef
fect, negate the union's choice of its agent:
Our interpretation of Weingarten must be tempered by a sense of
industrial reality. We do not advance the effectuation of em
ployee rights, or contribute to the stability of industrial relations,
if we complicate the already complex scheme of Weingarten by
introducing the notion that an employee may request this union
representative instead of that one, perhaps from a far comer of the
plant, and perhaps, in certain instances, contrary to the union's
wishes. In the instant case, a duly designated union representative
was ready, willing, able and present. We would inquire no
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Id. at 1127. See also Southwestern Bell, 251 N.L.R.B. at 625 n.7.
253 N.L.R.B. 1143 (1981).
Id.
Former Members Penello and Truesdale composed the majority.
253 N.L.R.B. at 1143 (emphasis in original).
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Given the proximity of the requested steward and the nature of
the employee's objections to the proffered steward, there is consider
able appeal to dissenting Member Jenkins' position that the balance,
between the employer's legitimate prerogative of conducting its in
vestigation and the employee's interest in obtaining the representa
tion he sought, should have been struck in favor of the employee.
Member Jenkins found that the majority neither required nor relied
upon any proffered justification as to why the employer could not
have tolerated a delay which, in the view of the majority, would not
have exceeded forty minutes.
While avoidance of delay and interference in investigatory or
disciplinary procedures is certainly a legitimate employer preroga
tive, a proper analysis requires that it be balanced against the coun
tervailing statutory interest in favor of limiting an employer's
discretion to control with whom an employee may engage in con
certed activity for mutual aid or protection. 201 Assuming the availa
bility of the requested representative, the employee's choice should
control. Therefore, in situations where an employee presents legiti
mate reasons for objecting to representation by the representative
provided by the employer, it is only reasonable to require that the
employer justify its denial of the employee's choice in terms of a
burden on its processes which is actual, rather than presumed and
which outweighs the employee's statutory interests. The Board's de
cision in Pac!fic Gas & Electric, however, requires no such justifica
tion on the part of the employer where an alternative, but undesired,
representative is present and suggests that any delay is an impermis
sible interference with a legitimate employer prerogative. 202 Thus, to
the extent the Board has balanced the competing interests of the em
200. Id at 1144.
201. See, e.g., Good Samaritan Nursing Home, Inc., 250 N.L.R.B. 207 (1980).
There, the employer unlawfully refused an employee's request for a witness telling the
employee that inasmuch as a supervisor was present to witness the meeting, the employee
did not need a witness. Id at 208. See also Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 251 N.L.R.B. 932, 934
(1980) (Board found that the employer could not deny an employee's request to be repre
sented by a fellow employee as opposed to the employee's union steward), enforced as
mod(fted, 674 F.2d 618 (7th Cir. 1982).
202. See Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co., 254 N.L.R.B. 375, 390
(1981), enforced mem., 673 F.2d 1314 (4th Cir. 1982) (Board found that an employer
acted lawfully when it provided as a representative an employee different than the one
requested, without making any attempt to determine the location or availability of the
requested employee). Cf. Coca-Cola Bottling Company, 227 N.L.R.B. 1276 (1977) and
Roadway Express, 246 N.L.R.B. 1127 (1979) (no inquiry was made as to the employer's

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

40

[Vol. 5:1

ployer and the employee, the balance has been struck heavily in
favor of the employer.
C.

The Representative

The Supreme Court's decision in Weingarten represents an in
terpretation of the scope of the section 7 right of employees to en
gage in concerted activity for mutual aid or protection; specifically,
that the section 7 right encompassed a right to union representation.
However, given the nature of the right affirmed therein, the Wein
garten decision left open a number of issues as to the type of repre
sentative guaranteed by section 7. Does the right to engage in
concerted activity for mutual aid or protection, a right not generally
dependent on representative status, also inure to unrepresented, as
well as represented employees? Assuming that there is a request for
union representation, what status must the union enjoy before a right
to representation by its agents will be guaranteed? In a series of
post-Weingarten decisions, the Board has answered both of these
questions.
1.

The Representative Status of the Employee and/or
Representative

In their dissenting opinion in Weingarten, Justices Powell and
Stewart noted that the majority's holding that the section 7 right to
engage in concerted activity guaranteed the right to union represen
tation had broader implications:
While the Court speaks only of the right to insist on the pres
ence of a union representative, it must be assumed that the § 7
right today recognized, affording employees the right to act "in
concert" in employer interviews, also exists in the absence of a
recognized union. 203
reasons for refusing to postpone the interviews and for refusing to provide the requested
representative).
The Board's discussion in Coca-Cola regarding the employee's failure to request an
alternate representative who was also not at the site indicates that an employer may have
to tolerate some delay when no other union representative is readily available. See Con
solidated Freightways Corp., 264 N.L.R.B. No. 76, 1982-83 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ~ 15,246,
at 25,789 (Oct. 22, 1982).
While Crown Zellerbach and Illinois Bell indicate that a fellow employee may,
under certain circumstances, satisfy an employee's request for union representation, the
Board has not yet been faced with a case where a fellow employee was provided by the
employer despite an employee's insistence on union representation.
203. 420 U.S. at 270 n.l (Stewart, J., dissenting). Cj NLRB v. Washington Alumi
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In Glomac Plastics,204 the Board expressed agreement with the
dissenting justices' logical assumption, stating:
We conclude that Section 7 rights are enjoyed by all employees
and are in no wise dependent on union representation for their
implementation. The Court's Weingarten and Quality decisions
are clearly grounded on Section 7 of the Act which guarantees
employees rights and guarantees, in particular, the right of em
ployees "to engage in . . . concerted activities for. . . other mu
tual aid or protection." We do not believe the Court's decisions
command us to interpret Section 7 in a manner which is clearly
restrictive of its broad scope or does violence to its purposes.
. . . [T]he Court's primary concern was with the right of em
ployees to have some measure of protection against unjust em
ployer practices, particularly those that threaten job security.
These employee concerns obtain whether or not the employees are
represented by a union. 205

The Board has adhered to its interpretation that the section 7
right to representation affirmed in Weingarten applies to represented
and unrepresented employees alike. Thus, in Anchortank, Inc. ,206
the Board noted that, not only were the statutory concerns underly
ing the Weingarten right unaffected by the absence of a collective
bargaining representative, but that the role of the representative as
envisioned by the Weingarten Court was likewise unaffected:
Indeed, the union representative's role is limited to assisting the
employee and possibly attempting to clarify the facts or suggest
other employees who may have knowledge of them. Thus, the
union representative is not permitted to use the powers conferred
upon the union by its designation as collective-bargaining agent,
and, in essence, may do no more during the course of the inter
view than could a fellow employee. 207
num Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962) (walkout by unrepresented employees amounted to concerted
activity).
204. 234 N.L.R.B. 1309 (1978), enforced, 600 F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1979).
205. 234 N.L.R.B. at 13l1.
206. 239 N.L.R.B. 430 (1978), enforced as mod!fied, 618 F.2d 1I53 (5th Cir. 1980).
207. Id at 430-31. As the Court noted in Weingarten:
[T)he employer has no duty to bargain with any union representative who may
be permitted to attend the investigatory interview. The Board said in Mobil
[Oil), we are not giving the Union any particular rights with respect to predis
ciplinary discussions which it otherwise was not able to secure during collec
. tive-bargaining negotiations.
420 U.S. at 259 (citation omitted).
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In Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 208 the Board relied on Glomac
and Anchortank and found that, given the section 7 right of employ
ees to act in concert, an employer could not deny an employee's re
quest to be represented by a fellow employee and require that the
employee be represented by a union agent. 209
While at least two courts of appeals 210 have indicated their
agreement that Weingarten rights inure to unrepresented employees,
the Board's holding in this regard has been recently criticized from
within. In Materials Research Corp. ,211 the two most recent appoint
ments to the Board, Chairman Van de Water and Member Hunter,
separately dissented from the Board's reversal of an administrative
law judge's conclusion, notwithstanding Glomac and Anchortank,
that Weingarten rights did not apply to unrepresented employees. 212
In their dissents, Chairman Van de Water and, particularly,
Member Hunter, focused on the Supreme Court's finding that a re
quest for union representation amounted to concerted activity for
mutual aid or protection since the union representative not only
safeguarded the interests of the particular employee but also the in
terests of the entire bargaining unit. They argued that a fellow em
ployee could not claim such status. 213 Member Hunter also focused
on the Court's discussion of the protection provided by a "knowl
edgeable union representative" who "could assist the employer by
eliciting favorable facts, and save the employer production time by
208.

251 N.L.R.B. 932 (1980), enforced as modified, 674 F.2d 618 (7th Cir. 1982).
Id at 933-34. The Board noted that concerted activity for mutual aid or pro
tection, when engaged in by represented employees, cannot be in derogation of their
bargaining agent's status. Id at 933. See also Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addi
tion Community Org., 420 U.S. 50 (1975). The Board found however, that nothing in the
operative collective bargaining agreement required the presence of a union representa
tive at investigatory interviews; that the employer and union had no oral understanding
as to the procedure for representation at such; and that the employee's request for a
fellow employee occurred at a time when no union agent was present at the site. 251
N.L.R.B. at 933. Accord Los Angeles Water Treatment, 263 N.L.R.B. No. 22, 1982-83
NLRB Dec. (CCH) ~ 15,\09, at 25,386 (Aug. 9, 1982).
2\0. See Anchortank, Inc. v. NLRB, 618 F.2d 1153 (5th Cir. 1980); NLRB v. Co
lumbia Univ., 541 F.2d 922 (2nd Cir. 1976).
211. 262 N.L.R.B. No. 122, 110 L.R.R.M. 1401 (1982). Members lenkins, Zim
merman, and Fanning composed the majority.
212. Id, 1\0 L.R.R.M. at 1406 (Chairman Van de Water, dissenting); Id, 1\0
L.R.R.M. at 1410 (Member Hunter, dissenting). As Glomac, Anchortank, and Illinois
Bell all involved requests for representation made by represented employees, their dis
cussion in the cases regarding the rights of unrepresented employees was dicta. Materials
Research, on the other hand, was the first case which squarely presented the issue. Id,
1\0 L.R.R.M. at 1401-02.
213. Id, 1\0 L.R.R.M. 1409 n.39 (Chairman Van de Water, dissenting); Id, 1\0
L.R.R.M. at 1411 (Member Hunter, dissenting).
209.
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getting to the bottom of the incident."214 Thus, the dissenters rea
soned that the right to representation found in Weingarten was
grounded in the Supreme Court's view of obligations and functions
of a collective bargaining representative. 21S
The majority answered both contentions. First it noted that the
Weingarten Court's discussion of the status and function of a union
representative constituted an explanation of why a request for union
representation constituted concerted activity for mutual aid or pro
tection and did not determine that only a request for such represen
tation fell within the literal wording of section 7.
An employee's request for the assistance of his union representa
tive constitutes concerted activity for mutual aid or protection,
whether or not the union representative is a fellow employee. In a
represented unit, the union is the embodiment of the concerted
activity of all unit employees and, as the Court noted, the repre
sentative serves a common interest as well as that of the individual
employee. However, a request for the assistance of a fellow em
ployee is also concerted activity-in its most basic and obvious
form-since employees are seeking to act together. It is likewise
activity for mutual aid or protection: by such, all employees can
214. Id, liD L.R.R.M. at 1411 (Member Hunter, dissenting). See NLRB v. J.
Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. at 263.
215. In support of this contention, Chairman Ven de Water argued that the right
involved in Weingarten was the right "to be free from employer interference which de
prives employees of the representation of their duly chosen agent." 262 N.L.R.B. No.
122, liD L.R.R.M. at 1408 n.36 (Chairman Van de Water, dissenting) (emphasis added).
In so characterizing the right, Chairman Van de Water relied heavily on the pre-Wein
garten, Texaco line of cases in which the Board had found a right to union representa
tion at disciplinary interviews as a function of the collective bargaining obligation.
While the Chairman was correct in his view of the holding of Texaco, he mischaracter
ized the nature of the Board's holding in Mobil Oil and Quality Mfg., wherein the Board
extended to investigatory interviews the right to a union representative on the basis of a
wholly different section 7 right-the right to engage in concerted activity for mutual aid
or protection-a right which does not require a collective bargaining relationship for its
exercise. See 196 N.L.R.B. at 1052; 195 N.L.R.B. at 198.
Chairman Van de Water's view of a Weingarten "representative" as a collective bar
gaining representative led him to conclude that a request for representation by a fellow
employee might constitute a seeking of mutual aid or protection under section 7 of the
Act. 262 N.L.R.B. No. 122, liD L.R.R.M. at 1410. He argued nonetheless, however, that
section 7 did not require the employer to grant such a request inasmuch as doing so
would require an employer to "recognize" and "deal with" a "representative" not chosen
by a majority of unit employees. Id Central to this position was the Chairman's view
that "Congress has declared that the means by which employees are to redress [the im
balance of economic power existing between employer and employee] is utilization of the
Act's processes for majority selection of an exclusive collective-bargaining representa
tive." Id, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1408 n.37. That view, however, is of doubtful validity. See
NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U:S. 9, 14-18 (1962).
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be assured that they can too can avail themselves of the assistance
of a Coworker in like circumstances, "as nobody doubts."216

Second, the majority reiterated what it had stated in G/omac
and Anchortank: A Weingarten representative was not present as a
collective bargaining representative and, therefore, a fellow em
ployee need not be a union representative to render assistance and
protection contemplated by the Court:
Furthermore, the type of assistance that any individual can pro
vide in the situation outlined in Weingarten is limited and can cer
tainly be performed by a fellow employee. A coworker can assist
by eliciting favorable facts and even, perhaps, save production
time by helping to get to the bottom of the problem that occa
sioned the interview. Certainly, that an employee is not part of a
represented unit does not alter the real possibility that a single
employee, confronted by an employer investigating conduct which
may result in discipline, may be too fearful or inarticulate to de
scribe accurately the incident being investigated, or too ignorant
to raise ex!enuating factors as was noted in Weingarten . . . More
over, a coworker who has witnessed employer action and can ac
curately inform coemployees may diminish any tendency by an
employer to act unjustly or arbitrarily.
It is for the employee himself to determine whether the pres
ence of a coworker at an investigatory interview provides some
measure of protection. Here, [the employee], apparently believed
it did. We would not substitute our judgment for that of employ
ees who have shown that they believe that the presence of a co
216. 262 N.L.R.B. No. 122, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1405. In concluding that a request for
union representation constituted concerted activity for mutual aid or protection, the
Weingarten Court found that the common interest served by a union representative
made such activity, in terms of the applicability of section 7, analagous to that found in
NLRB v. Peter Cailler Kohler Swiss Chocolates Co., 130 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1942). The
Weingarten Court stated that
[w]hen all the other workmen in a shop make common cause with a fellow
workman over his separate grievance, and go out on strike in his support, they
engage in a 'concerted activity' for 'mutual aid or protection,' although the ag
grieved workman is the only one of them who has any immediate stake in the
outcome. The rest know that by their action each one of them assures himself,
in case his turn ever comes, of the support of the one whom they are all then
helping; and the solidarity so established is 'mutual aid' in the most literal
sense, as nobody doubts.
420 U.S. at 261 (quoting NLRB v. Peter Cailler Kohler Swiss Chocolates Co., 130 F.2d
503, 505-06 (2d Cir. 1942».
To argue that the same does not apply to unrepresented employees turns on its head
the rationale for Weingarten's holding that a request for union representation falls within
the ambit of section 7.
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worker lends a measure of meaningful protection. 217

2.

The Status of the Union

The Weingarten Court's holding that the representation or
assistance rendered by a union agent to an employee constitutes con
certed activity for mutual aid or protection is, as noted above,218
predicated on the union's agent's serving not only the interests of the
particular employee, but the interests of all employees in the bar
gaining unit. It therefore follows that, before section 7 obligates an
employer to accede to a request for union representation, the union
must be in a position to claim the right to serve the entire bargaining
unit. In both Glomac and Anchortank, the Board determined the
applicability of section 7 to a request for union representation at a
time when the employer was denying or challenging the union's sta
tus as the representative of unit employees.
In Glomac, the union had been certified by the Board and rec
ognized by the employer. In the context of unlawful, bad faith bar
gaining, however, _the employer denied an employees request for
union representation, informing the employee that she did not have
a union and that the employer did not recognize one. 219 In adopting
the administrative law judge's finding that the employee nevertheless
had a section 7 right to union representation, the Board noted that
this right could not be dependent on the employer's refusal to ac
knowledge the union's status as the employees' chosen
representative.
We do not draw a distinction between union-represented employ
ees and employees who have chosen union representation but
have been deprived of the benefits of that representation as a re
sult of the employer's refusal to bargain in good faith with their
designated representative.
The national labor policy of encouraging good-faith collec
tive bargaining would be undermined if an employer were to be
217. 262 N.L.R.B. No. 122, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1405-06. The section 7 right of "em
ployees" to engage in concerted activity for mutual aid or protection should not guaran
tee a right to representation by an individual not an employee of the employer solely on
the grounds that such individual is an employee of someone. Unlike the non-employee
union agent, such individual cannot claim to represent the interests of the unit as a
whole. Further, an employer's property rights should not, on balance, be required to give
way to the presence of a non-employee where there exist other employees of the em
ployer capable of fulfilling the request for a representative. See supra note 107. See also
Sentry Investigation Corp., 249 N.L.R.B. 926, 936 n.20 (1980).
218. See supra text accompanying note 68.
219. 234 N.L.R.B. at 1311.
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allowed to defeat its employee's right to have a representative
present by engaging in unlawful bad-faith bargaining which the
employer could then rely on to assert that no recognized union
representative exists. To permit the Respondent's own miscon
duct thus to reduce or eliminate the employee's right to have a
union representative present is to allow the Respondent's unlawful
action to determine the reach and applicability of Section 7 rights.
We cannot reward the wrongdoer for conduct which violated Sec
tion 8(a)(5) of the ACt. 220

In Anchortank, the Board again found that it was the union's
actual status as the chosen majority representative of the employee's
that was determinative of the section 7 right to union representation.
Thete, the union had won a representation election but, unlike
G/omac, had not yet been certified by the Board or recognized by the
employer. 221 The administrative law judge had found that, inas
much as the employer was under no obligation to bargain with the
union at the time of the interview, employees had no section 7 right
to the assistance of the union. 222 In reversing the administrative law
judge, the Board found that, given the employee's selection of the
union, its lack of certification or recognition was irrelevant.
The central issue of the Weingarten decision was whether the em
ployee's Section 7 right to engage in concerted activity extended to
the encounter between employee and employer in an interview
which could reasonably result in disciplinary action. In that case,
the concerted activity took the specific form of a request for assist
ance from a statutory representative. However, the Court and the
Board placed the emphasis upon the employee's right to act con
certedly for protection in the face of a threat to job security, and
not upon the right to be represented by a duly designated collec
tive bargaining representative.
. . . Here, [the employees] requested union representation at
a time when the Union had been selected by a majority of em
ployees in a Board-conducted election, but had not yet been certi
fied as bargaining representative. Their request was an exercise of
the right guaranteed to them by Section 7 to act in concert for
mutual aid or protection. In these circumstances, the status of the
requested representative, whether it be that of a union not yet cer
tified or simply that of fellow employee, does not operate to de
prive the employees of the rights which they enjoy by virtue of the
220. Id. at 1310-11. Accord Brown & Connolly. Inc.• 237 N.L.R.B. 271 (1978).
221. 239 N.L.R.B. at 431.
222. Id. at 434.
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plain mandate in Section 7. 223

The statement of the Board in Anchortank regarding the status
of the requested representative as being either a noncertified union
or a fellow employee leaves open the question of whether a lack of
certification or recognition would deprive an employee of the repre
sentation of a nonemployee union agent. For in balancing the inter
ests of employers and employees under section 7, the Board has
accorded greater weight to an employer's property rights when the
activity of nonemployee union agents is involved. 224 The Board has
yet to be faced squarely with a case involving the denial of a request
for representation by a nonemployee agent of a union not yet certi
fied. However, it would appear that employees' choice of the union
as the representative, an act which allows the union to claim the
right to represent the interests of all the bargaining unit members,
would still be the determinative factor and at least one federal ap
peals court has so found.
In enforcing, with modifications,225 the decision of the Board in
Anchortank, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that an
employee had no right to union representation by a nonemployee
union agent before the union wins a representation election. 226 The
court also found, however, that an employer acts at its peril if, fol
lowing a representation election won by the union, it denies a re
quest for representation by a nonemployee union agent. 227 The
court reasoned as follows:
The situation is radically altered, however, after a representa
tion election is held, and the union is victorious, even if that vic
tory is challenged. At that point, the request of the employee for
union representation takes on an entirely different character; the
nature of the activity changes. No longer is the employee asking
for the participation of a nonemployee who is in a position to rep
223. Id at 430. Accord PPG Industries, 251 N.L.R.B. 1146 (1980); Good Samari
tan Nursing Home, Inc., 250 N.L.R.B. 207 (1980).

224. See generally NLRB v. Babcock and Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956) (em
ployers can restrict non-employee union organizers' access to employer property in situa
tions where it would be improper to so restrict employee union organizers).
225. The Fifth Circuit remanded to the Board the issue of whether a particular
interview involved in the case fell within the Board's decision in Baton Rouge Water.
Anchortank, Inc. v. NLRB, 618 F.2d IIS3, 1169 (5th Cir. 1980).
226. Id at 1163. The same would seem to hold true regarding a request for repre
sentation by a fellow employee acting in the capacity of a union agent. Since a Wein
garten representative, however, does not perform the role of a collective bargaining
representative, the distinction is of no practical importance.
227. Id at 1162.
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resent only the employee's individual interest . . . . After the
union has won the election, the employee quite properly perceives
his request to be one for the concerted mutual aid and protection
of his fellow employees, for the union then stands in for all the
unit employees. 228
The court further contended that:
We believe that this situation is analogous to that in which
the employer, in the face of a union's challenged election victory,
unilaterally changes conditions of employment that are
mandatory subjects of bargaining. In such a situation, prior to
resolution of the election challenge, the employer may assert his
prerogative to manage his plant without interference at the risk
that his conduct will violate section 8(a)(5) if the union has indeed
won the election and is later certified. 229
To the extent that the Fifth Circuit opinion in Anchortank holds
that an employee's right to union representation stems from the
union's status as the chosen representative of unit employees, it is
consistent with the Supreme Court's view of the union representative
as serving the interests of the entire bargaining unit. On that basis,
the finding that the employer may exclude nonemployee union
agents until the union obtains such status represents a reasonable
accommodation between employer property rights and the em
ployee's right to seek and engage in concerted activity for mutual aid
or protection. Further, since it is the union's status as the chosen
representative, that gives rise to the right to union representation, it
is likewise proper to hold that the employer only act at its peril if it
denies a request for representation by a nonemployee union agent,
and not to be found to have restrained section 7 rights if, ultimately,
the union's election victory is overtumed. 230
However, a representation election is not the sole method for
determining employee choice of a representative. Under NLRB v.
Gissel Packing CO.,231 the Board will look to a union's designation
228. Id
229. Id at 1164-65.
230. As the court noted, this principle is supported by Board law holding that an
employer acts at its peril if, following an election but prior to the union's certification, the
employer unilaterally changes terms and conditions of employment. See Mike
O'Connor Chevrolet-Buick-GMC, Inc., 209 N.L.R.B. 701 (1974).
As the court also pointed out, the protected nature of the employee's request does
not depend on whether or not the union is ultimately certified because in making the
request, the employee is nonetheless initiating group action. Anchortank, Inc. v. NLRB,
618 F.2d 1153, 1165 n.22 (5th Cir. 1980).
231. 395 U.S. 575 (1969). See also Peaker Run Coal Co., 228 N.L.R.B. 93 (1977);
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pursuant to authorization cards in circumstances where an em
ployer's unfair labor practices have rendered invalid an election a
union has lost and, depending on the seriousness of those unfair la
bor practices, will order bargaining based on the union's designation
through authorization cards. Since, in Gissel-type cases, the union is
found to be the chosen representative on the basis of authorization
cards, the right to union representation should also attach, in the
same circumstances, on the basis of the card designation. Thus, if
the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Anchortank is read always to require a
union election victory before representation by a nonemployee
union agent is guaranteed, Gissel-type situations would be ignored·
and the right to union representation would be overly restricted.
3.

The Role of the Representative

The Supreme Court noted that the nature of the section 7 right
affirmed in Weingarten required certain limitations on the assistance
or representation provided by the Weingarten representative. The
most significant limitation is that the employer need not bargain
with any representative who may attend the interview and that the
representative may not "use the powers conferred upon the union by
its designation as collective-bargaining representative."232 The Wein
garten Court also noted that the exercise of the right could not inter
fere with legitimate employer prerogatives and that the employer
was under no obligation to proceed with an interview in the face of a
request for representation. 233 The Court therefore recognized that,
through the exercise of its legitimate prerogatives, an employer could
restrict the activity of the representative: ''The representative is pres
ent to assist the employee, and attempt to clarify the facts or suggest
other employees who may have knowledge of them. The employer,
however, is free to insist that he is only interested, at that time, in
hearing the employee's account of the matter under investiga
tion."234 A third limitation on the role of the representative
stemmed from the Court's view of investigatory interviews as being
preliminary to the disciplinary process and presenting, therefore, the
opportunity only for informal, nonadversarial exchange:
A single employee confronted by an employer investigating
Drug Package Co., 228 N.L.R.B. 108 (1977), enforced in parI, 570 F.2d 1340 (8th Cir.
1978).
232. See supra text accompanying note 208.
233. 420 U.S. at 258.
234. Id at 260.

50

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5:1

whether certain conduct deserves discipline may be too fearful or
inarticulate to relate accurately the incident being investigated, or
too ignorant to raise extenuating factors. A knowledgeable union
representative could assist the employer by eliciting facts, and
save the employer production time by getting to the bottom of the
incident occasioning the interview. Certainly his presence need
not transform the interview into an adversary contest. 235

The Court's view of the role of the representative, especially in
terms of the employer's ability to affect that role by limiting the in
terview, led dissenting Justices Powell and Stewart to comment that
the right to representation as defined by the Court appeared to be of
little value to the employee, perhaps limited to that of a silent wit
ness. 236 Nevertheless, it is clear that, in describing the assistance that
a Weingarten representative could render,237 the Court did envision
some active role. Further, the essence of Weingarten is that, to the
extent an employer chooses to conduct an interview, it is obligated
upon request to allow for the exercise of concerted activity between
the employee and his representative. 238
In Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. ,239 the Board held that an
employer could not, at the outset of interview, restrict the role of the
Weingarten representative to that of a mere witness. 24O There, the
employer demanded that the requested union representative not
speak during the interview and argued that the restriction was per
mitted by the Supreme Court's Weingarten statement that the em
ployer was "free to insist that he is only interested, at the time, in
hearing the employee's own account of the matter under investiga
tion."241 Nevertheless, the Board found that this employer right had
to be balanced against the employee's right to the assistance and
235. Id at 262-63.
236. Id at 273 n.5 (Powell & Stewart, JJ., dissenting).
237. Id at 263-64.
238. While the silent presence of the representative could be construed as con
certed activity for mutual aid or protection, the issue is whether the employer's exercise
of legitimate prerogatives may restrict the concerted activity of the representative and
employee to silent presence only.
239. 251 N.L.R.B. 612 (1980), enforcement denied, 667 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1982).
240. Id at 613. Accord United Technologies Corp., 260 N.L.R.B. No. 196, 110
L.R.R.M. 1017 (1982); Texaco Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 633, enforced, 659 F.2d 124 (9th Cir.
1981). In enforcing Texaco, Inc. the Ninth Circuit adopted the Board's view. 659 F.2d
at 126. In denying enforcement of Southwestern Bell, the Fifth Circuit found, on the
facts, that the representative had been allowed to participate during the interview. 667
F.2d at 473. The Fifth Circuit expressly distinguished its view of the facts in Southwest
ern Bell from those presented in Texaco, Inc. , where it was found that the representative
was not allowed any participation. Id at 474 n.3.
241. 251 N.L.R.B. at 613 (quoting Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 260).
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counsel of the representative. 242 For it was through this right that
the employee and representative engaged in concerted activity for
mutual aid or protection and to preclude any assistance by the repre
sentative was, in effect, to preclude the exercise of the Weingarten
right. The Board therefore found that the employer's legitimate pre
rogative to regulate the role of the representative could not extend
beyond a reasonable prevention of collective bargaining or an adver
sary confrontation, both of which were viewed by the Supreme
Court as outside the permissible role of the representative and the
context in which the interview took place. 243 Since the employer had
attempted to silence the representative at the outset of the interview,
its actions could not be construed as being reasonably related to
avoiding either collective bargaining over possible discipline or
avoiding an adversary contest. The Board therefore found the re
striction to constitute unwarranted interference with the employee's
section 7 right to representation. 244
The exact nature of reasonable prevention of collective bargain
ing or an adversary conflict has not yet been addressed by the Board
but would, of course, depend on the particular circumstances of each
case. Southwestern Bell does, at least, stand for the proposition that
an employer must allow some active role for the representative by
which the representative assists the employee while not necessarily
speaking for him. 245
D.

Waiver of the Right

The Weingarten Court recognized that the right to representa
tion, as an individual section 7 right, could only be exercised if in
voked by the employee. 246 The Court also held that once invoked,
242. 251 N.L.R.B. at 613.
243. Id
244. Id
245. Id at 615. In denying enforcement of Southwestern Bell, the Ninth Circuit
found that the employer had allowed the representative to participate at the end of the
interview. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. NLRB, 667 F.2d 470, 473 (5th Cir. 1982). It
could be argued that restricting the representative's participation until after the employee
has given "his own account of the matter under investigation" unduly restricts the em
ployee's right to assistance and representation. While the representative may be pre
vented from speaking for the employee, an employee who is either "too fearful or
inarticulate to relate accurately the incident being investigated" would be better served
by assistance that is rendered to him prior to or during the giving of his own account and
that aids him in presenting that account. See Pacific Tel. And Tel. 262 N.L.R.B. No. 127,
110 L.R.R.M. 1411 (1982); Climax Molybdenum Co., 227 N.L.R.B. 1189, 1189-90 (1977),
enforcement denied, 584 F.2d 360 (10th Cir. 1978).
246. 420 U.S. at 257.
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the right could be waived by the employee. 247 Thus, the Court noted
that the employer could offer the employee a choice of an interview
without representation or no interview at all and, if the employee
chose the former, he would forgo any benefit that might be derived
from the interview. 248 In post-Weingarten cases, the Board has de
cided what constitutes a valid waiver of the right to representation,
finding that the waiver must be made not only knowingly, but also
voluntarily.
In Super Valu Xenia, 249 the Board adopted an administrative
law judge's decision rejecting the employer's contention that an em
ployee waived his right to representation by attending the interview
after the request for representation had been denied. The adminis
trative law judge noted that, under Weingarten, an employer could
not conduct an interview after denying the employee's request for
representation without first affording the employee the choice of an
interview without representation or no interview at all.250 Absent
the offering of such choice, the employee could not be presumed to
either have been aware of it or have made it:
The fact that [the employee] stayed, and answered the questions
put to him, did not make his participation voluntary or constitute
a waiver of his right to union representation. It should not be
requisite to the continued maintenance of the properly asserted
right of union representation that the lone employee further an
tagonize the employer and jeopardize his job by walking out of
the meeting or by refusing to answer questions. 251
In Postal Service ,252 the Board held that a waiver of Weingarten
rights could not be inferred from an express waiver of "Miranda"
rights,253 inasmuch as the Weingarten right to representation has a
different foundation and purpose than the constitutional right
against self-incrimination. The Board again noted that, unless the
employee is offered the choice of an interview without representation
247. Id. at 257.
248. Id. 420 U.S. at 258.
249. 236 N.L.R.B. 1581 (1978), enforcement denied, 627 F.2d I3 (6th Cir. 1981).
250. Id. at 1591.
251. Id. In denying enforcement of the Board's finding that the employer violated
section 8(a)(I) by conducting the interview, the Sixth Circuit held that the employee had,
in fact, waived his Weingarten rights by proceeding with the meeting. Super Valu Xenia
v. NLRB, 627 F.2d 12, I3 (6th Cir. 1980). Such holding in inconsistent with the Wein
garten decision itself, where the employee likewise failed to exercise self-help by refusing
to participate in the interview. See 420 U.S. at 254.
252. 241 N.L.R.B. 141 (1979).
253. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

1982)

RIGHT TO REPRESENTATION

53

or not interview at all, a waiver of the right will not be found. 254
Similarly, in Montgomery Ward & Co. ,255 the Board adopted an
administrative law judge's finding that the following signed state
ments were insufficient to waive Weingarten rights: "I agree that
representatives of Montgomery Ward Co., Inc., may interview me,
commencing from the time designated below, on matters relating to
company business. It is fully understood that I am free to leave this
interview at any time I so desire."256
The administrative law judge noted that although an employer
was under no burden to inform an employee of his right to union
representation, an alleged waiver which did not specifically refer to
union representation lacked the specificity to render it effective. 257
In Southwestern Bell,258 a Board majority found that an em
ployee must waive his right to representation voluntarily.259 There,
employees were told in response to their requests for representation
that, inasmuch as granting the requests would require that higher
management officials be called in, more severe discipline might be
meted out. 260 The Board concluded that the employees' subsequent
attendance at the interviews did not indicate a voluntary waiver of
their rights, but rather one which resulted from unlawful coercion:
Weingarten does not require that after having made his request,
an employee must remain adamant in the face of predictions of
dire ultimate consequences. The Employer's threat that the exer
cise of the right to representation would lead to more severe disci
pline or that the employee's fate would be in more capricious and
hostile hands is no less interference and restraint than an outright
denial of his right. 261

Indeed, as the majority noted, to "conclude that an employer may
play upon these fears to dissuade an employee from remaining firm
in his request would defeat the right Weingarten protects."262
While the employee may waive his individual section 7 right to
engage in concerted activity, the Board has yet to decide whether a
254.
255.
1981).
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

241 N.L.R.B. at 141.
254 N.L.R.B. 826 (1981), enforcement denied in part, 664 F.2d 1095 (8th Cir.
Id at 828.
Id at 831.
227 N.L.R.B. 1223 (1977).
Id
Id
Id
Id
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union can, by contract, waive the right on behalf of employees. 263
While the issue has been raised in a number of cases, the Board has
either found that it was not necessary to decide it264 or that the al
leged waivers involved were not, in any event, clear and unmistaka
ble. 265 While the Supreme Court did not address the issue in
Weingarten,266 at least one federal appeals court has found that a
. contractual waiver did operate to deny the employees their right to
union representation. In Prudential Insurance Co. of America v.
NLRB,267 the Fifth Circuit found, contrary to the Board, that the
union had, in fact waived the employees' right to union representa
tion. 268 The court further found that such waiver was effective:
Identifying the Weingarten right as an individual right does not
mean that it cannot be contractually waived by the union. A
union is allowed a great deal of flexibility in serving its bargaining
unit during contract negotiations. It makes concessions and ac
cepts advantages it believes are in the best interest of the employ
ees it represents. . . . This. . . includes the right of the union to
waive some employee rights, even the employee's individual statu
tory rights. . . . Courts which have invalidated a clear contrac
tual waiver of an employee's individual statutory right have done
so only when the waived right affects the employee's right to exer
cise his basic choice of bargaining representative. 269

In light of the Fifth Circuit's opinion, the Board is currently
reconsidering its decision in a second case involving the same parties
and the same contractual provision, and presumably will state its po
sition on the effect of contractual waivers of Weingarten rights. In
light of the pending issue before the Board, it would not be appropri
ate to indicate whether I would agree or disagree with that court's
view of a union's authority in this regard. I note, however, the issue
that I perceive to be involved.
A union has no statutory right to be present at a Weingarten
263. In a pre-Weingarten case, former Chairman Miller indicated that he believed
a union could waive an employee's Weingarten right. See Western Elee. Co., 198
N.L.R.B. 1623, 625 (1972).
264. See Airco Alloys, 249 N.L.R.B. 524 (1980); Baton Rouge Water Works Co.,
246 N.L.R.B. 995 (1979).
265. See United States Postal Serv., 256 N.L.R.B. 78 (1981), enforcement denied on
other grounds, 689 F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1982); Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 254 N.L.R.B.
247 (1981); Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 251 N.L.R.B. 1591 (1980), enforcement de
nied, 661 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981).
266. See 420 U.S. at 275 n.8 (Powell, J., dissenting).
267. 661 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981).
268. Id at 400.
269. Id at 400-01 (citations omitted).
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interview and, therefore, has no right to waive on its own behalf.
Nevertheless, the exercise of the Weingarten right requires that the
requested representative be willing to assist the employee. It could
therefore be that a union does have the power to agree, during the
course of collective bargaining, that it will not provide the assistance
of its agents and, in this sense, the union can be said to have waived
the employees' right to union representation. Such an agreement,
however, is not actually a waiver of the employees' section 7 right to
engage in concerted activity for mutual aid or protection. An em
ployee's request for union representation still falls within the protec
tion of section 7 and his failure to obtain such assistance results only
from the union's refusal to provide it and not from any waiver of his
statutory right to seek it.
The more important question raised by alleged contractual
waivers of the Weingarten right is whether a union has the power to
waive the employee's statutory right to engage in concerted activity
for mutual aid or protection. If so, the union could not only deny an
employee the right to union representation but the right to represen
tation or assistance by fellow employees as well. The above quoted
language from the Prudential Insurance 270 decision would, of course,
support an argument that a union has such authority. However,
while a union's waiver of the employees' right to engage in concerted
activity for mutual aid or protection as it relates to union representa
tion may not "affect the employee's right to exercise his basic choice
of bargaining representative,"271 it may be that the same does not
hold true in the case of the union's waiver of the right as it relates to
the representation and assistance provided by fellow employees. In
each instance that a union restricts the right of employees to engage
in concerted activity for mutual aid or protection apart from the
union, such restriction benefits the union qua union. This is so be
cause as a result of the restriction, employees are thereby locked into
the union as the sole vehicle by which they may engage in concerted
activity for mutual aid or protection and are denied the opportunity
to test the benefits of unionism against whatever benefits they might
gain by concerted action without a union. 272 To this extent, the
union's waiver of the employees' section 7 right to the representation
and assistance of fellow employees does affect employee choice in
regard to whether employees would choose to be represented at
270. See supra text accompanying note 270.
271. 661 F.2d at 401. See NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322 (1974); NLRB v.
Mid-States Metal Prods., Inc., 403 F.2d 702 (5th Cir. 1968).
272. See, e.g., NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962).
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all. 273
Even if it were assumed that a union does have the power to
waive the employees' right to representation by a fellow employee,
the waiver of such a fundamental right is not lightly inferred. There
fore, a contractual clause which purports to waive union representa
tion should not operate to waive the right to representation by fellow
employees, and the effect of such waiver of union representation
only should be no more than to deny the employee the assistance of
nonemployee union agents. 274
E.

The Scope of the Right

As discussed in the first section of this article,275 the Supreme
Court's decision in Weingarten affirmed the Board's interpretation of
the scope of the section 7 right to engage in concerted activity for
mutual aid or protection as set out in Quality Manufacturing and Mo
bilOil that section 7 guaranteed the right not only to insist upon, but
to have, union representation at investigatory interviews at which the
reasonable fear of discipline obtained. The right to engage in con
certed activity, however, guarantees more than just the specific rights
affirmed in Weingarten. As Materials Research illustrates, the right
is not limited to union representation but applies to representation
by fellow employees as well. 276 Under Baton Rouge Water, the right
is not necessarily limited to purely investigatory interviews. 277 Fur
ther, as illustrated by Quality Manufacturing, section 7 protects not
only the employee who requests or insists upon representation; at
tempts that are likewise concerted activity for mutual aid or
protection. 278
Two important post- Weingarten decisions made by the Board
273. See NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322, 325-26 (1974).
274. A request for a union steward who is also a fellow employee is still a request
for representation by a fellow employee. A union, of course, may agree to deny an em
ployee the services of its stewards as stewards. As previously noted, however, a Wein
garten "representative" does not act as a collective bargaining representative and
therefore may do no more than that which can be done by a fellow employee. See supra
note 208 and accompanying text. See also Los Angeles Water Treatment, 263 NLRB
No. 22, 1982-83 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 1115,109, at 25,386 (Aug. 9, 1982). Compare NLRB
v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 661 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981), with the Fifth
Circuit's discussion of the right to be represented by a fellow employee as opposed to a
non-employee union agent in Anchortank, Inc. v. NLRB, 618 F.2d 1153, 1162-65 (5th
Cir. 1980).
275. See supra text accompanying notes 64-70.
276. 262 N.L.R.B. No. 122, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1405.
277. 246 N.L.R.B. at 997.
278. 195 N.L.R.B. at 198-99.
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indicate the broad scope of the right to engage in concerted activity
as it relates to interviews to which the reasonable fear of discipline
obtains. In Climax Molybdenum,279 a Board majority280 held that
the right to engage in concerted activity for mutual aid or protection
guarantees an employee a right to consult with his representative
before the interview. The majority noted that the Supreme Court's
discussion of a knowledgeable representative in Weingarten dictated
that the right to representation include a right to prior consultation:
[T]he representative's aid in eliciting the facts can be performed
better, and perhaps only, if he can consult with the employee be
forehand. To preclude such advance discussion ... seems to us
to thwart one of the purposes approved in Weingarten. Nothing in
the rationale of Weingarten suggests that, in its endorsement of the
role of a "knowledgeable union representative," the Supreme
Court meant to put blinders on the union representative by deny
ing him the opportunity of learning the facts by consultation with
the employee prior to the investigatory-disciplinary interview.
Knowledgeability implies the very opposite. The right to repre
sentation clearly embraces the right to prior consultation. 281

The majority also rejected the contentions of the dissenters that
allowing for a consultation between the employee and his Wein
garten representative would impede the investigation process and
transform the interview into an adversary contest contrary to the
Supreme Court's admonition:
The greater knowledgeability acquired by prior consultation obvi
ously does not alter the nature of the interview but only advances
the fact finding process. Nor will prior consultation, as the dissent
suggests, cause unions to bring "pressures to bear on an employee
to withhold the facts." [T]he fact remains that a union representa
tive so inclined could engage in such conduct about as effectively
at the interview as in talks with the employee prior to the inter
view. If we had to speculate, we would guess that lack of prior
279. 227 N.L.R.B. 1189 (1977), enforcement denied, 584 F.2d 360 (lOih Cir. 1978).
280. Member Jenkins, former Chairman Murphy and former Member Fanning
composed the majority. Former Members Penello and Walther dissented. In his concur
ring opinion, former Member Fanning stated that prior consultation was "not something
different than, [sic) nor superior to, the act of representation itself; it is simply an aspect
of that function which enables the representative to fulfill its role," 227 N.L.R.B. at 1191
(Member Fanning, concurring). He further pointed out that since "consultation" was
likewise concerted activity for mutual aid or protection, it mattered not, once the request
for representation was granted, whether the employee or representative sought the con
sultation. Id at 1191-92.
281. Id at 1190.
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consultation would strongly incline an employee representative to
those obstructionist tactics as a precautionary means of protecting
employees from unknown possibilities. Perhaps all we are sug
gesting is that knowledge is a better basis . . . for the successful
carrying out of labor-management relations. 282
Recently, in Pac!fic Telephone & Telegraph Co. ,283 a Board ma
jority284 held that the right to prior consultation includes a right to
be informed as to the subject of the interview as well. 285 Without
such information, the employee and representative have nothing
about which to consult and, therefore, the right to consultation found
in Climax Molybdenum,286 in effect, would be denied. In response to
a dissent by Member Hunter,287 the Board majority took occasion to
reaffirm the holding of Climax Molybdenum:
Prior consultation, and the knowledge which results therefrom,
enables the representative to "assist the Employer by eliciting
favorable facts and save the Employer production time by getting
to the bottom of the incident." At the same time, it enables the
representative to counsel and assist the employee ... [and] pro
vide the aid or protection which the employee seeks.
. . . Indeed, the act of "consultation" is no less "concerted
activity for mutual aid or protection" than the act of representa
tion itself. It is likewise activity aimed at countering employer ac
tion which threatens the employee's terms and conditions of
employment. Moreover, it need not interfere with legitimate em
ployer prerogatives any more than the act of representation.
When faced with an employee's insistence on concerted action, the
Employer is still free to reject the collective course and forego the
interview. Further, the Employer controls the manner, form, and
timing of its investigatory and disciplinary process and can take
steps to protect its legitimate interests while at the same time give
282. Id
283. 262 N.L.R.B. No. 127, liD L.R.R.M. 1411 (1982).
284. Members Jenkins, Zimmerman and Fanning composed the majority.
285. 262 N.L.R.B. No. 127, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1412.
286. In denying enforcement of Climax Molybdenum, the Tenth Circuit relied on
the fact that the employees involved were aware of the interviews 17 1/2 hours in ad
vance, but had not sought to consult with the representative on their own time; that the
employees had not requested representation; and that the union had an express policy of
informing employees not to cooperate in such interviews. Climax Molybdenum Co. v.
NLRB, 584 F.2d 360, 362-65 (10th Cir. 1978). These facts were not present in Pac(/ic Tel
& Tel See 262 N.L.R.B. No. 127, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1412 n.5.
287. 262 N.L.R.B. No. 127, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1413 (Member Hunter, dissenting).
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due regard to the exercise of Section 7 rights. 288
In response to Member Hunter's assertion that finding a right to
prior consultation and information transformed investigatory inter
views into formalized adversarial contests with all the attributes of
full-scale criminal proceedings, the majority outlined certain limita
tions on those rights:
All Climax requires is that, as a function of an employee's right to
engage in concerted activity for mutual aid or protection, a
preinterview consultation with his Weingarten representative be
permitted. This consultation need be nothing more than that
which provides the representative an opportunity to become fa
miliar with the employee's circumstances. To require that the
Employer inform the employee as to the subject matter of the in
terview does not dictate anything resembling "discovery." The
Employer does not have to reveal its case, the information it has
obtained, or even the specifics of the misconduct to be discussed.
A general statement as to the subject matter of the interview,
which identifies to the employee and his representative the mis
conduct for which discipline may be imposed, will suflice. 289
The Board's interpretation of the scope of section 7 in Climax
Molybdenum andPaciftc Telephone represents the same balancing of
interests which resulted in the Weingarten right. Essential to the
striking of that balance is the Board's view that prior consultation
and information regarding the subject of the interview enables the
representation contemplated by Weingarten to take place,29o con
ceivably aids the employer,291 and is only a limited burden on the
employer's investigatory process. 292 Any burden, in fact, is really no
more than the burden caused by representation itself. As such, it is a
balance struck "in the light of the mischief to be corrected and the
288. Id, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1412 (footnotes omitted). Pacific Tel & Tel involved
an investigation of two employees for a single incident of theft. In his dissent, Member
Hunter argued that allowing for prior consultation with the union representative before
each employee's separate interview could defeat the employer's legitimate interest in
preventing the employees, through the single representative, from fabricating consistent
accounts of their activities. Id, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1415 (Member Hunter, dissenting).
Such interest on the part of the employer, however, could be readily served by providing
a different representative for each employee. Such would be a reasonable restriction on
the employees' choice of representative, in light of the circumstances of the investigation,
and would serve both the employees' right to representation and the employer's legiti
mate interests in conducting its investigation.
289. Id. 110 L.R.R.M. at 1413 (footnote omitted).
290. Id, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1412.
291. Id
292. Id
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end to be attained."293
When an employee requests or insists upon representation at a
Weingarten interview, he is attempting to engage in concerted activ
ity for mutual aid or protection and, therefore, the request is pro
tected by section 7. 294 However, conduct which would otherwise
amount to protected activity may lose the protection of the Act de
pending on the manner in which it is carried out. In a number of
post- Weingarten decisions, the Board has passed on the protected
nature of certain employee actions aimed at enforcing Weingarten
rights.
In Spartan Stores, Inc. ,295 the Board held that section 7 pro
tected an employee's attempts to obtain his union steward at the out
set of an investigatory interview. There, the employee was
summoned to his supervisor's office and questioned as to the reason
for his leaving an employee meeting earlier that day. The employee,
believing that he was to be disciplined, walked out of the office, stat
ing that he was going to get his union steward. Despite supervisory
requests that he remain, the employee obtained the steward and re
turned to the office, whereupon he was discharged for refusing to
obey orders. 296 The Board concluded that the employee's actions
amounted to a refusal to participate in a Weingarten interview ab
sent representation and was therefore protected. 297 The Board, not
ing that the employee returned within two minutes, heavily relied
upon the fact that, contrary to established practice, the employee's
supervisors neither summoned the steward nor gave the employee
any indication that they would do SO.298
In General Electric Co. ,299 the Board indicated that an em
ployee's attempts to exercise self-help by obtaining his steward
would not be protected where, unlike Spartan Stores, the supervisor
indicated that he would summon the steward for the employee. By
indicating that the steward would be called, the supervisor had, in
fact, granted the employee's request. The Board therefore concluded
293. Id; 420 u.s. at 262. The Board has found, however, that Weingarten does not
encompass a request to produce witnesses at an investigatory interview. Coyne Cylinder
Co., 251 N.L.R.B. 1503, 1504 n.6 (1980).
294. ILGWU v. Quality Mfg. Co., 420 U.S. at 280-81.
295. 235 N.L.R.B. 522 (1978), enforcement denied, 628 F.2d 953 (6th Cir. 1980).
296. Id at 522.
297. Id at 522-23. Similarly, the Board has held that an outburst by an employee
in the course of insisting on representation was protected by section 7. Roy H. Park
Broadcasting, 255 N.L.R.B. 229, 230-34 (1981).
298. 235 N.L.R.B. at 522.
299. 240 N.L.R.B. 479 (1980).
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that the employee's self-help, in direct contravention of his supervi
sor's order, could not be in furtherance of his right to refuse to par
ticipate in the interview without representation. 3°O
In Roadway Express,301 a Board majority found that an em
ployee's refusal to leave the plant floor to attend a Weingarten inter
view was unprotected. There, the employee was directed to his
supervisor's office following an altercation, but refused to report ab
sent his union steward. 302 The majority concluded that the em
ployer's right to maintain discipline on the plant floor privileged its
disciplining of the employee for his refusal:
In Weingarten, it was the Supreme Court's design that, on the one
hand, an employee not be compelled to participate in an investiga
tory interview in the absence of union representation while, on the
other hand, exercise ofthe employee's right may not interfere with
legitimate employer prerogatives. The two concepts are not mutu
ally exclusive, of course, and we do not believe that preservation
of the former must necessarily result in the derogation of the lat
ter. Simply stated, we find that an employee's Weingarten rights,
with all its attendant safeguards, matures at the commencement of
the interview, be it on the production floor or in a supervisor's
office. If the Employer chooses to initiate its investigation in a
work area, then it is bound to comply immediately with an em
ployee's request for representation there. If, however, the Em
ployer as here, asks the employee to leave the production area and
go to an office or some other location where further discussion is
contemplated, then the employee acts at his or her peril if she de
clines to do SO.303
Member Jenkins and I dissented, arguing that the majority's
creation of a distinction between refusals to leave the plant floor and
refusals to attend Weingarten interviews absent representation
amounted to an arbitrary, procedural pitfall which seriously under
mined the exercise of the Weingarten right.304 As we viewed the
matter, the employee's refusal to report to the office absent his stew
ard constituted an insistence upon representation at the upcoming
interview and, absent some disruptive conduct accompanying that
insistence,305 could not be rendered unprotected by section 7 merely
300.
301.
composed
302.
303.
304.
305.

Id at 481.
246 N.L.R.B. 1127 (1979). Former Members Penello, Murphy and Truesdale
the majority.
Id
Id at 1128. See also Chrysler Corp., 241 N.L.R.B. lO50, lO53-55 (1979).
246 N.L.R.B. at 1131 (Member Jenkins and Chairman Fanning, dissenting).
See Chrysler Corp., 241 N.L.R.B. lO50, 1052 n.8.
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on the grounds of the employer's right to maintain discipline and
order. In this regard, we noted that, if the employer's concern was
merely to remove the employee from the plant floor and not to deny
his request for representation, it could have so assured the employee
or ordered the employee off the premises without an interview. Ab
sent assurances, we saw no reason to place the burden of sorting out
the employer's intentions on the employee, the individual least re
sponsible for any ambiguity in that regard. Rather, we found that
the employee could, under the circumstances, reasonably believe
that reporting to the office would result in his being questioned with
out representation:
The only discernible employer interest involved in being able to
force an employee off the plant floor in this instance is that the
Employer be given yet another chance to understand the illegality
of its rejection of the Weingarten request. The majority's
"preinterview discussion," during which an employer belatedly
might attempt to respond lawfully to the employee's request, em
bodies a mere speculation, and an ill-founded one, in view of the
majority's recognition that the employee need not repeat his re
quest at the actual interview. From the employee's perspective on
the plant floor, there is no reason for him to believe that the Em
ployer will relent from its unlawful stance once he leaves his work
area, particularly where the site of the interview is but a few feet
away. Accordingly, it is manifest that the majority requires the
employee to do a futile act in order to preserve his right to assist
ance. Such a holding seriously undercuts the protection of
Weingarten .306

.

In failing to require an employer to assure an employee who
refuses to report to a meeting without representation that leaving the
production area will not result in a denial of his request, the majority
opinion in Roadway Express accords absolute protection to an em
ployer's interest in avoiding disruption, while giving no weight to the
employee's right to representation. Conversely, requiring an em
ployer, in such circumstances, to assure an employee that his rights
will be preserved is a minimal intrusion into an employer's right to
maintain discipline and, therefore, would reasonably accommodate
the interests of both sides. In this regard, Roadway Express is con
trary to Spartan Stores and General Electric, where the protected na
ture of employee self-help in furtherance of the Weingarten right was
found to be dependent on the absence of assurances that the em
306. 246 N.L.R.B. at 1131.
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ployee's request for representation would be granted. 307
Recently, a Board majority seriously restricted the scope of sec
tion 7 protections as they relate to concerted activity aimed at ob
taining union representation. In Bridgeport Hospital 3 0 8 the
employer, following several incidents of vandalism, called a meeting
of its security guards to discuss the problem. At the meeting, three
guards insisted that their union representative be present and walked
out of the meeting when their request was denied. The administra
tive law judge reasoned that, inasmuch as the meeting was not one to
which Weingarten rights attached, the guards had no right to a Wein
garten representative and, therefore, no right to refuse to participate
in the meeting absent such representation. 309 The majority adopted
the administrative law judge's conclusion that the guards had been
lawfully disciplined for insubordination in walking out of the meet
ing, finding that their right to act in concert to obtain the presence of
the union representative was no broader than their statutory right
thereto. 310
Member Jenkins and I dissented. 3)) While Weingarten may
have been inapplicable to the meeting inasmuch as it did not concern
possible discipline,3)2 we noted that the statutory right to engage in
concerted activity for mutual aid or protection is not limited to situa
tions where the activity is aimed at enforcing a statutory right. Thus,
while the employer in Bridgeport Hospital could lawfully deny the
request for the presence of the union agent and conduct the meeting
without him,3)3 that fact did not preclude the employees from engag
ing in a concerted walkout to obtain the presence of the representa
tive. As we viewed the matter, the presence of the union agent at
307. See supra text accompanying notes 296-301. Likewise, the Board has found
that employer assurances that a particular interview would not result in discipline are a
significant factor in determining whether an employee has a reasonable fear of discipline
in regard to the interview. See supra note 64. Roadway Express recently has been inter
preted as involving a refusal to comply with a directive that resulted in a disruption or
disturbance challenging supervisory authority. See E. I. Dupont De Nemours, 262
N.L.R.B. No. 123, 110 L.R.R.M. 1417, 1419 n.5 (1982). The broad holding of Roadway
Express, therefore, may be limited.
308. 265 N.L.R.B. No. 54, 1982-83 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ~ 15,371, at 26,142 (Nov.
17, 1982). Chairman Van de Water, Member Zimmerman and Member Hunter com
posed the majority.
309. Id, 1982-83 NLRB Dec. at 26,143.
310. Id, 1982-83 NLRB Dec. at 26,142.
311. Id, 1982-83 NLRB Dec. at 26,144 (Members Fanning & Jenkins, dissenting).
312. See Northwest Eng'g, 265 N.L.R.B. No. 26, 1982-83 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ~
15,311, at 26,013 (Oct. 22, 1982).
313. An action that the existence of the statutory right to representation does not
allow.
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such a meeting was related to the interests of employees and a term
and condition of employment. 314 It was therefore a proper subject
for concerted activity for mutual aid protection. In short, the walk
out amounted to a strike for which the employees could not be
disciplined. 315
In Bridgeport Hospital, the majority refused to view the em
ployer's lawful denial of the request for the presence of the union
agent as a term and condition of employment which could be the
subject of a protected protest. 316 This refusal was the direct result of
a failure to discern the full scope of the section 7 right to engage in
concerted activities for mutual aid or protection apart from the Wein
garten context. For in finding that the existence of the Weingarten
right determined the protected nature of the employees' walkout, the
majority ignored the fact that the Weingarten right is no more than
one application of section 7 as it relates to a specific set of circum
stances. That such circumstances may not be present in a particular
case does not, however, end the inquiry and determine the scope of
section 7. It was the majority's failure to look beyond the Wein
garten context in Bridgeport Hospital which lead it to interpret sec
tion 7 in a manner "restrictive in its broad scope" and one which did
"violence to its purposes. "317
F. Remedy
When an employee is disciplined because of an insistence upon
or request for representation at a Weingarten interview, the disci
pline is for the exercise of section 7 rights and the appropriate rem
edy is restoration of the status quo ante, including expungement of
the disciplinary record as well as reinstatement and backpay where
applicable. 318
However, not all discipline occurring in Weingarten situations is
314. 265 N.L.R.B. No. 54, 1982-83 NLRB Dec. at 26,144 (Members Jenkins and
Fanning, dissenting).
315. See NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 14-17 (1962). Of
course, the employees in Bridgeport Hospital were no more entitled to the presence of
their union agent than the employees in Washington Aluminum were entitled to a heated
workplace, but the fact that an employer could lawfully resist such demands did not
render the walkout in Bridgeport Hospital any less protected than the walkout in Wash·
ington Aluminum.
316. 265 N.L.R.B. No. 54, 1982-83 NLRB Dec. at 26,144.
317. Glomac Plastics, 234 N.L.R.B. at 1311.
318. ILGWU v. Quality Mfg. Co., 420 U.S. 276, 280-81 (1975). See also Salt River
Valley Water Users' Ass'n, 262 N.L.R.B: No. 129, 110 L.R.R.M. 1396, 1396 (1982);
United States Postal Serv., 237 N.L.R.B. 1104, 1104 n.l (1978), enforcement denied, 614
F.2d 384 (4th Cir. 1980).
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motivated by the employee's attempt to exercise section 7 rights. In
many cases, discipline which follows a Weingarten-violative inter
view is for the underlying misconduct or performance which is the
subject ofthe interview. In such alleged just cause discipline cases, it
can be argued that the disciplinary decision is neither in response to
the employee's exercise of Weingarten rights nor affected by the un
derlying unlawful denial of representation. If so, restoration of the
status quo ante would put the employee in a better position than he
enjoyed before the unlawful interview and, therefore, would be inap
propriate. Moreover, where discipline is suspension or discharge,
any make-whole remedy for the underlying Weingarten violation
must be consistent with section lO(c) of the Act which provides: "No
order of the Board shall require the reinstatement of any individual
as an employee who has been suspended or discharged, or the pay
ment to him of any back pay, if such individual was suspended or
discharged for cause."319
However, to the extent that a disciplinary decision which fol
lows a Weingarten-violative interview is based at all on that inter
view, the discipline is not, in fact, for cause. Rather, the disciplinary
decision has been tainted by the unlawful denial of representation,
had for the employee been accorded his statutory rights, the decision
might have been different. Nor should an employer be allowed to
benefit from its derogation of an employee's statutory rights. Thus,
on this theory, the Board, in several cases, ordered reinstatement and
backpay for discharges viewed as the results of unlawful inter
views. 32o The discharge was considered to be outside the remedial
restrictions of section lO(c) in that, as a result or effect of the unlaw
ful interview, it came within the scope of the Board's remedial
authority to wipe out the effects of unfair labor practices through
restoration of the status quo ante. 321
The Board's result-of-one interview approach to the appropri
ateness of make-whole remedies properly attempted to identify, as
the basis for the remedy, a causal relationship between the underly
ing unfair labor practice and the discipline. However, not all disci
319. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976).
320. Anchortank, Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. at 434-35; Potter Elec. Signal Co., 237
N.L.R.B. 1289, 1292 (1978), enforcement denied in parI, 600 F.2d 120 (8th Cir. 1979);
Super Valu Xenia, 236 N.L.R.B. at 1592; Southwestern Bell Tel., 227 N.L.R.B. at 1223
n.1.
321. Compare Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964) wilh
NLRB v. Potter Elec. Signal Co., 600 F.2d 120 (8th Cir. 1979) (section 10(c) prohibits
Board from ordering reinstatement or back pay for employees discharged for obvious
misconduct).
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pline which follows an unlawful interview can be termed a result
thereof. An interview may neither add to nor serve as confirmation
of what the employer has learned independently. Although the fact
that the interview was conducted cannot be erased from the em
ployer's decisionmaking process, its contribution to the disciplinary
decision may be insignificant. In short, while the interview may be a
link in a causal chain which culminates in discipline, it is not a cause
of the discipline in the sense that it is a factor in the decision or that
the decision was based thereon. To exclude such interviews from
application of a make-whole remedy requires a standard of causality
which avoids a per se application by distinguishing between unlaw
ful interviews which serve as an actual basis for discipline and those
which do not.
In Kraft Foods, Inc. ,322 a Board majority focused on the em
ployer's reliance on information obtained in a WeIngarten-violative
interview as the critical factor in determining whether or not there
existed a direct causal relationship between interview and discipline
sufficient to justify a make-whole remedy:
In determining the appropriate remedy for a respondent's viola
tion of an employee's Weingarten rights, the Board applies the fol
lowing analysis. Initially, we determine whether the General
Counsel has made a primafacie showing that a make-whole rem
edy such as reinstatement, backpay, and expungement of all disci
plinary records is warranted. The General Counsel can make this
showing by proving that Respondent conducted an investigatory
interview in violation of Weingarten and that the employee whose
rights were violated was subsequently disciplined for the conduct
which was the subject of the unlawful interview.
In the face of such a showing, the burden shifts to the Re
spondent. Thus, in order to negate the primafacie showing of the
appropriateness of the make-whole remedy, the Respondent must
demonstrate that its decision to discipline the employee in ques
tion was not based on information obtained at the unlawful inter
view. Where the Respondent meets its burden, a make-whole
remedy will not be ordered. Instead, we will provide our tradi
tional cease-and-desist order in remedy of the 8(a)(l) violation. 323
322. 251 N.L.R.B. 598 (1980).
323. Id Former Members Penell(l and Truesdale and Chairman Fanning com
posed the majority. Member Jenkins dissented from this aspect of the decision. He ar
gued that, once a Weingarten-violative interview is followed by discipline, "it becomes
virtually impossible to determine whether the disciplinary decision was based upon 'in
formation' obtained at the unlawful interview." Id at 599. For Member Jenkins, the
"impossibility" of the employer meeting its burden stemmed not as a result of the alloca
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The Kraft Foods requirement that the employer has the burden
of establishing that the discipline was not based on information ob
tained during the unlawful interview recognizes the fact that it is the
employer's wrongdoing that puts into issue what part, if any, the in
terview plays in any disciplinary decision. Accordingly, it is for the
wrongdoer to sort out the matter by showing that what is otherwise
the appropriate remedy for an unfair labor practice is, in fact, inap
propriate. 324 However, the analysis makes it clear that, to the extent
discipline is presumed to result from a prior unlawful interview, such
a presumption is rebuttable. 325
Under Kraft Foods, an employer may establish that an inter
view was not a cause of subsequent discipline by establishing that it
did not base the discipline upon information it obtained during the
interview, and therefore, that the discipline would have occurred ab
tion of the burden, but rather from his belief that it was impossible not to base discipline
on a prior interview. He thus viewed the Kraft Foods analysis as a useless and burden
some test which would render a result no different from the per se test that the majority
was rejecting. See id at 599-600.
324. See Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 251 N .L.R.B. 1194, 1194 (1980), enforce
ment denied in part, 676 F.2d 499 (11th Cir. 1982).
325. In Kraft Foods, the majority found that the employer had, in fact, established
that it did not base the discipline on any information it obtained during the unlawful
interview. Noting that the unlawful interview entailed nothing more than the employee's
denial that he had been engaged in a fight and the identification of a photograph depict
ing the situs of a forklift collision, the majority concluded that the discipline had been
based on information obtained independently by the employer. 251 N.L.R.B. at 599.
The Board has also found that an employer met its Kraji Foods burden by establishing
that the interview entailed nothing more than an employee's denial of guilt. Coyne Cyl
inder Co., 251 N.L.R.B. 1503 (1980). Further, the Board has found that an employer
failed to meet its Kraft Foods burden where a confession of wrongdoing was obtained
during the interview. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 251 N.L.R.B. 932, 932-35 (1980); Texaco Inc.,
251 N.L.R.B. 633, 634-37 (1980). But if. United States Postal Serv., 254 N.L.R.B. 703
(1981) (discharge based on information received from eyewitnesses).
Establishing that a disciplinary decision was not based on information obtained dur
ing an unlawful interview may, for the most part, be a function of establishing the in
tended purpose of the interview and the use to which the information is to be put. If, by
an interview, an employer sought to determine whether misconduct occurred, to confirm
its suspicions as to an employee's participation in misconduct, or to assign fault, it is most
likely that the employer based the discipline on the interview. On the other hand, if the
employer acquired such information independently and conducted the interview merely
to allow the employee to tell his side of the story, explain his conduct, or present mitigat
ing factors, it is most likely that whatever information gained was only incidental to the
disciplinary decision and obtained only for the purpose of concluding the case and pro
viding a record for future use. For example, an employer is certainly capable of proving
that it did not rely on a confession sought and obtained during an unlawful interview by
establishing that it only sought the confession to strengthen its case regarding a subse
quent grievance over the discharge or to support a criminal complaint, and not to deter
mine whether the employee was in fact guilty of misconduct.
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sent the interview. In this regard, however, information should not
be read as limited to affirmative or tangible evidence. Rather, it is
the existence of a direct causal relationship between interview and
discipline that determines the appropriateness of the make-whole
remedy. Reliance on statements, tangible evidence, or other affirma
tive information is not the only way a direct causal relationship can
exist. For example, it might be established in a particular case that
the employer construed an employee's silence as an admission of
guilt or was similarly persuaded on the basis of the employee's de
meanor. In such a case, the degree to which discipline was based on
what transpired during the interview may be no less than the case
wherein actual information is obtained and relied upon. In fact, the
causal link may be stronger.
In Ohio Masonic Homes 326 a Board panel recognized this fact.
There, an employee was subjected to a Weingarten-violative investi
gatory interview following various complaints regarding her per
formance and, subsequently, she was suspended. The Board
concluded that the employer had failed to meet its burden of estab
lishing that discipline was not based on information obtained during
the interview. Rather, the Board found that the employee ''was sus
pended because she did not have a satisfactory explanation in re
sponse to the complaints, rather than merely because there had been
some complaints."327 The Board therefore recognized that an em
ployee's failure to offer a satisfactory explanation during an in
terview may constitute information upon which a disciplinary
decision is based.328
The Ohio Masonic holding that an employee's failure to offer a
satisfactory explanation may constitute "information" upon which
discipline could be based should not be construed broadly. For to
presume always that an employee's inability to exculpate himself
during any unlawful interview is information upon which the disci
plinary decision is based represents an adoption of the per se ap
proach to make-whole remedies that Kraft Foods sought to avoid.
Inherent in any decision to discipline is the fact that the employee
has been unable to convince the employer that the discipline is un
warranted. Employers do not generally discipline employees who
have proffered satisfactory explanations or presented mitigating fac
tors. Thus, to the extent that a disciplinary decision is presumed to
326. 251 N.L.R.B. 606 (1980).
327. Id at 607.
328. Id
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have been predicated on the employee's failure to offer a satisfactory
explanation for the conduct under investigation, it is impossible for
the employer to meet the Kraft Foods burden by establishing that it
did not base discipline on information obtained during the unlawful
interview. 329 Ohio Masonic should therefore be strictly limited to sit
uations where it has been affirmatively established that the em
ployee's inability to proffer a satisfactory explanation was a
determinative factor for the employer in establishing the employee's
guilt. 330 In this sense only can the employee's failure be properly
construed as a direct cause of the discipline and one which precludes
the employer from establishing that discipline would have occurred
even absent the unlawful interview.
The imposition of a make-whole remedy does not forever pre
clude an employer from disciplining the employee for conduct that
was the subject of the unlawful interview. All that the remedy effects
is restoration of the status quo ante. The employee is still faced with
the prospect of discipline just as he was prior to the unlawful inter
view. Therefore, the employer can discipline the employee after an
investigatory interview conducted in accordance with the employee's
section 7 rights to impose discipline without an interview on the ba
sis of evidence gathered independently of the unlawful interview. 331
The Board's application of the make-whole remedy to discipline
following Weingarten-violative interviews has been criticized by sev
eral courts of appeal, particularly the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit. In denying enforcement of a make-whole
remedy in NLRB Y. Potier Electric Signal Co. ,332 that court found
that section lO(c) of the Act barred restoration of the status quo ante
in any case where the discharge was not in retaliation for the exercise
of Weingarten rights, but rather, based on the underlying misconduct
which was the subject of the investigation:
While the Board has broad authority to restore the status quo and
make whole any losses suffered by the employees because of un
fair labor practices, ... it does not have the power to order rein
statement or back pay for employees' discharged for obvious
329. See Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 262 N.L.R.B. No. 125, 110 L.R.R.M. 1416, 1417
n.2 (1982) (Member Jenkins, concurring in part, dissenting in part).
330. The burden of going forward with evidence to show that the employer affirm
atively relied upon the employee's failure to offer a satisfactory explanation thus rests
with the Board's General Counsel, who must rebut the employer's evidence that the dis
cipline would have occurred absent the unlawful interview.
331. Penn-Dixie Steel Corp., 253 N.L.R.B. 91, 96 (1980).
332. 600 F.2d 120, 124 (8th Cir. 1979).
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personal misconduct, because t() do so would violate Section l(c)
as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Fibreboard. 333
While the Eighth Circuit appears to be of the opinion that resto
ration of the status quo ante is barred absolutely by section lO(c), the
Seventh Circuit has taken a less restrictive view. In Illinois Bell Tele
333. Id See Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964). Ac
cord Montgomery Ward & Co., 664 F.2d 1095 (8th cii-. 1981).
Fibreboard involved the application of a make-whole remedy ordering reinstate
ment of employees laid-off pursuant to a decision to subcontract unit work. The lay-off
decision violated the employer's duty to bargain in good faith with the union. The
Supreme Court rejected the employer's contention that the layoff nonetheless was for
cause and therefore outside the scope of the Board's remedial authority as limited by
section lO(c). 379 U.S. at 217. The Supreme Court found that the layoff stemmed di
rectly from the unfair labor practice and was, therefore, within the scope of the Board's
remedial authority. Id In distinguishing Fibreboard, the Eighth Circuit relied on the
Supreme Court's view that section 10(c) was designed to preclude the Board from rein
stating individuals discharged for misconduct. 664 F.2d at 1097. The Supreme Court in
Fibreboard expressed this view by quoting a report ofthe United States House of Repre
sentatives. The Court said:
The House Report states that the provision was intended to put an end to
the belief, now widely held and certainly justified by the Board's decision, that
engaging in union activities carries with it a license to loaf, wander about the
plants, refuse to work, waste time, break rules, and engage in incivilities and
other disorders and misconduct.
379 U.S. at 217 n.ll (quoting H. R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 42 (1947».
The Conference Report notes that under § lO(c) employees who are discharged
or suspended for interfering with other employees at work, whether or not in
order to transact union business, or for engaging in activities, whether or not
union activities, contrary to shop rules, or for Communist activities, or for other
cause [interfering with war production) ... will not be entitled to
reinstatement.
379 U.S. at 217 n.ll (quoting H. R. CONF. REp. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 55 (1947).
As expressed in the above footnote, the legislative history of section lO(c) indicates
the concern of Congress that union activity not be a shield against that which is otherwise
a discharge or suspension for cause. It recognizes the obvious fact that a discharge or
suspension for cause does not entail an illegal motive or constitute an unfair labor prac
tice. Section lO(c) would also appear to bar reinstatement for discharges or suspensions
for cause which, because of their impact on organizational rights, could be interpreted as
unfair labor practices. This may occur where an employee's union activity also consti
tutes misconduct and where the discharge or suspension of a union activist for what
would otherwise be cause is, nonetheless, viewed as restraint and coercion of the section 7
rights of other unit employees solely by virtue of the activist's removal from the work
place. In neither case does the discipline "[stem) directly from an unfair labor practice
. . . ." 379 U.S. at 217. Discipline, however, which is based on infomiation obtained
during a Weingarten-violative interview does stem directly from an unfair labor practice
and therefore falls within the scope of the Board's remedial authority as interpreted in
Fibreboard. The Eighth Circuit's holding that section lO(c) bars reinstatement in all
cases where discipline is for cause based on personal misconduct represents an overly
restrictive reading of Fibreboard and an overly broad reading of the legislative history of
section 1O(c).

1982)

RIGHT TO REPRESENTATION

71

phone & Telegraph Co. ,334 that court remanded the reinstatement is
sue to the Board for the purpose of determining whether the
discipline of the employee stemmed solely from the unlawful inter
view. 335 The court reasoned that restoration of the status quo ante
would be inappropriate where the employer could establish that the
discipline "is and was supported by other independent evidence
which was available to the Company at the time of the discharge."336
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has apparently
adopted the Seventh Circuit's analysis. In General Motors Corp. v.
NLRB,337 the court refused to enforce a make-whole remedy on the
grounds that evidence gathered before an unlawful interview repre
sented independent evidence of good cause for the discharge and
that, while the employer had not discharged the employee on the
basis of that evidence alone, it could have. 338
Unlike the Eighth Circuit, the Sixth and Seventh Circuits do not
treat section lO(c) as an absolute bar to a make-whole remedy for
discipline based on Weingarten-violative interviews. However, hold
ing that such a remedy is inappropriate where there exists independ
ent evidence which could otherwise support the discipline severely
restricts the Board's authority to remedy the effects of unfair labor
practices. Given that information obtained during an unlawful in
terview is a determinative factor in the discipline, the necessary
causal relationship between the unfair labor practice and the disci
pline exists. The information need not be the sole basis. Given a
disciplinary decision based on information obtained during an un
lawful interview, it matters not whether there exists other informa
tion upon which the employer could have relied, since such evidence
cannot alter what is, in fact, a causal relationship between the inter
view and the discipline. However, what is relevant, in terms of es
tablishing whether the causal relationship exists at all, is whether the
employer would have relied on such independent evidence as a basis
for the discharge in the absence of the unlawful interview. Thus,
under a proper analysis, it is insufficient for the employer to prove
that the discipline did not stem solely from the interview. To the
334. 674 F.2d 618 (7th Cir. 1982).
335. Id at 623.
336. Id
337. 674 F.2d 576 (6th Cir. 1982).
338. Id at 578. Former Member Truesdale took a similar view. See Texaco Inc.,
251 N.L.R.B. 633, 638 (1980) (former Member Truesdale, dissenting); Southern Bell Tel.
& Tel. Co., 251 N.L.R.B. 1194, 1194 (1980) (former Member Truesdale, dissenting in
part), enforcement denied in part, 676 F.2d 499 (11th Cir. 1980).
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contrary, the employer's burden should be to prove that the disci
pline stemmed solely from the independent evidence; meaning that
the discipline would have occurred, in fact, absent the unlawful in
terview. In only this sense can it be established that the unfair labor
practice was not a cause of the discipline. 339
IV.

CONCLUSION

As the Supreme Court recognized in Weingarten, section 7 of
the National Labo~ Relations Act is designed to "redress the per
ceived imbalance of economic power between labor and manage
ment,"340 by guaranteeing employees, inter alia, the right to act in
concert for mutual aid or protection. Situations in which employees
seek the aid of their designated bargaining representative or fellow
employees in order to protect or advance their job interests and eco
nomic well being vis-a- vis their employer are limitless. The Wein
garten right constitutes an interpretation of section 7 designed to
address only one of these situations-where the employee reason
ably fears that discipline will result from an interview or meeting
with his employer.
While the section 7 right to engage in concerted activity for mu
tual aid or protection is, by its terms, a broad right, its application
necessarily entails a balancing of the countervailing interests of em
ployers and employees. In Weingarten, that balance was struck in
favor of the interests of employees in a manner which gave full
recognition to the statutory policies underlying section 7. In apply
ing the Weingarten right as enunciated by the Supreme Court, I be
lieve that the Board has fared well by continuing to interpret section
7 to its full scope as it relates to requests for representation at meet
ings or interviews in which the reasonable fear of discipline obtains.
Materials Research,341 Pac!fic Telephone,342 and Climax Molybde
num ,343 all entail interpretations of the scope of section 7 which are
consistent with and fully serve its underlying statutory policy. They
339. See Montgomery Ward & Co., 254 N.L.R.B. 826 (1981), enforcement denied in
pari, 664 F.2d 1095 (8th Cir. 1981). There, a Board panel found that the employer had
failed to meet its burden under Kraft Foods. Id Inasmuch as the employee admitted to
theft at the unfair labor practice hearing, however, the panel majority composed of
Chairman Fanning and Member Jenkins found that the employee had forfeited his right
to reinstatement and ordered backpay only up until the date of his admission. Id
340. 420 U.S. at 262 (quoting American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300,
316 (1965».
341. See supra notes 212-18 and accompanying text.
342. See supra notes 284-94 and accompanying text.
343. See supra notes 280-83 and accompanying text.
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provide employees, through concerted action, a measure of protec
tion against employer action which threatens job tenure.
The Board has had difficulty, however, in applying Weingarten
to the particular circumstances which arise in various cases. In Coca
Cola,344 Pac!ftc Gas & Electric,345 and Roadway Express,346 the
Board, in balancing the competing interests of the employer and em
ployee under the facts of each case, struck the balance so heavily in
favor of the employer's interests that it totally denied the employee
any right to seek protection against action harmful to his job inter
ests. That, on occasion, the Board has erred in striking the balance
between employers and employees in its application of Weingarten is
understandable. Weingarten cases hardly ever present the same set
of facts. Thus the Board is called upon to continually weigh the in
terests of employers and employees and adjust the balance under
taken in Weingarten where it feels that such adjustment is required
by the particular circumstance of any case. That the Board has done
so is nothing more than an exercise of its "special function of apply
ing the general provisions of the Act to the complexities of industrial
life."347 And it is those complexities.which, at times, make the Wein
garten right a difficult one to grasp.

344.
345.
. 346.
347.

See supra notes 177-86 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 197-203 and accompanying text .
See supra notes 187-92 and accompanying text.
420 U.S. at 266.

